{"id":"W2169982830","doi":"10.1287/orsc.1060.0241","title":"Incentives to Cheat: The Influence of Executive Compensation and Firm Performance on Financial Misrepresentation","year":2007,"lang":"en","type":"article","venue":"Organization Science","topic":"Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance","field":"Business, Management and Accounting","cited_by":765,"is_retracted":false,"has_abstract":true,"ca_institutions":"","funders":"York University; Carnegie Mellon University","keywords":"Misrepresentation; Misconduct; Incentive; Executive compensation; Accountability; Business; Accounting; Compensation (psychology); Sample (material); Financial statement; Appearance of impropriety; Economics; Actuarial science; Finance; Microeconomics; Audit; Psychology; Social psychology; Political science; Law","routes":{"ca_aff":false,"ca_fund":true,"ca_venue":false,"about_ca":false,"invisible_to_affiliation_only":true},"retraction":null,"screen":null}