{"id":"W2950990081","doi":"10.48550/arxiv.1312.1831","title":"Welfare Maximization and Truthfulness in Mechanism Design with Ordinal Preferences","year":2013,"lang":"en","type":"preprint","venue":"arXiv (Cornell University)","topic":"Game Theory and Voting Systems","field":"Economics, Econometrics and Finance","cited_by":1,"is_retracted":false,"has_abstract":true,"ca_institutions":"University of Waterloo","funders":"","keywords":"Impossibility; Mechanism design; Outcome (game theory); Social choice theory; Arrow's impossibility theorem; Matching (statistics); Mathematical economics; Maximization; Computer science; Mechanism (biology); Rank (graph theory); Metric (unit); Voting; Matroid; Social Welfare; Pairwise comparison; Microeconomics; Economics; Mathematics; Artificial intelligence; Statistics; Discrete mathematics; Epistemology; Combinatorics","routes":{"ca_aff":true,"ca_fund":false,"ca_venue":false,"about_ca":false,"invisible_to_affiliation_only":false},"retraction":null,"screen":{"n_in":0,"stratum":"aff_core","weight":5595.2375,"opus":{"tier":"OUT","genre":"empirical","about_ca":false,"confidence":"high","reason":"Theoretical paper on welfare maximization and truthfulness in ordinal mechanism design."},"gpt":{"tier":"OUT","genre":"conceptual","about_ca":false,"confidence":"high","reason":"It develops mathematical mechanisms for voting and matching markets, not methods of research."},"grok":{"tier":"OUT","genre":"conceptual","about_ca":false,"confidence":"high","reason":"Theoretical mechanism design and voting/matching markets; computational social choice, not research practice."}}}