Smart cheaters do prosper: defeating trust and reputation systems
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Traders in electronic marketplaces may behave dishonestly, cheating other agents. A multitude of trust and reputation systems have been proposed to try to cope with the problem of cheating. These systems are often evaluated by measuring their performance against simple agents that cheat randomly. Unfortunately, these systems are not often evaluated from the perspective of security—can a motivated attacker defeat the protection? Previously, it was argued that existing systems may suffer from vulnerabilities that permit effective, profitable cheating despite the use of the system. In this work, we experimentally substantiate the presence of these vulnerabilities by successfully implementing and testing a number of such ‘attacks’, which consist only of sequences of sales (honest and dishonest) that can be executed in the system. This investigation also reveals two new, previously-unnoted cheating techniques. Our success in executing these attacks compellingly makes a key point: security must be a central design goal for developers of trust and reputation systems. 1.
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.007 | 0.037 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.002 | 0.004 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.003 | 0.008 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.003 |
| Research integrity | 0.002 | 0.003 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.003 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".