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Record W1491863701 · doi:10.3828/jtep.2010.44.2.119

Effects of Airport Concession Revenue Sharing on Airline Competition and Social Welfare

2010· article· en· W1491863701 on OpenAlex

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

affAt least one author lists a Canadian institution in the pinned OpenAlex snapshot.

Bibliographic record

VenueJournal of transport economics and policy · 2010
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
TopicAviation Industry Analysis and Trends
Canadian institutionsUniversity of British Columbia
Fundersnot available
KeywordsRevenue sharingRevenueCompetition (biology)OligopolyMonopolyBusinessWelfareSocial WelfareIndustrial organizationMicroeconomicsBenchmark (surveying)EconomicsCournot competitionFinanceMarket economy

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

This paper studies the competitive and welfare implications when an airport offers airlines the option of sharing its concession revenue. By studying a non-congested airport whose aeronautical charge is regulated, we find that revenue sharing allows the airport and airlines to internalise a positive demand externality between aeronautical services and concession services, which may improve welfare. However, revenue sharing may cause a negative effect on airline competition. An airport may strategically share the revenue with its dominant airlines, which can further strengthen these firms' market power. Such exclusive revenue sharing may or may not improve welfare. Implications for a general airport–airline vertical relationship are discussed.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.000
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Observational · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.815
Threshold uncertainty score0.393

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.013
GPT teacher head0.235
Teacher spread0.222 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it