Why this work is in the frame
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Bibliographic record
Abstract
What were the real intentions of Franklin D. Roosevelt about the monopoly policy of atomic energy toward Russia? The questions remained unsolved, because when Roosevelt died on April 12th, 1945, he did not leave any indications in his memo or diary. After World War Ⅱ, two interpretations have been developed about Roosevelt's real intention. The first interpretation is that Roosevelt might have played a double game so as not to offend Winton S. Churchill and Joseph Stalin. The second interpretation is that Roosevelt may have thought that the destructive atomic weapon could deter the Russians from their postwar expansionism. Therefore The atomic weapon might be Roosevelt's last hidden card. I think that these interpretations are insufficient to explain his intentions. so I tried to discuss these issues with relation to American hegemony after World War Ⅱ. The purpose of this article is to search through probing recent academic achievements for the development of the Manhattan Project and Roosevelt's real intentions to conceal the fact from Russia until his sudden death. During World War Ⅱ, the Roosevelt Administration made every effort to maintain a good relationship with Russia, because the United States and Great Britain desperately needed military assistance from Russia to defeat the Axis powers. However, the wartime relationship between the Anglo-American Alliance and the Soviet Russia had not been always kept satisfactorily, partly because of their different political systems and their hostile ideology and partly because of their mutual mistrust. 1n 1942, the United States with the partnership of Great Britain started the Manhattan Project to make atomic bombs. From the start the diplomatic relationship between the United States and Great Britain could not be maintained smoothly, because many American top leaders, who had been participating in the Mahattan Project, didn't wish to share all of their information with Great Britain. However the British prime minister, Churchill, met President Roosevelt at Washington, Hyde Park, and Quebec several times, and demanded that he share with Great Britain with complete information on atomic energy. Finally Roosevelt accepted Churchill's demand, because he thought that maintenance of the Aglo-American wartime alliance would be more important than making an American monopoly of atomic energy. One of the troublesome dilemmas with which President Roosevelt had dealt was whether the United States and Great Britain should share secret information on atomic energy with Russia or not. British politicians, including Churchill, and the top leaders of the American military advised Roosevelt not to share that information with Soviet Russia. Consequently, I believe that Roosevelt initially tried a double play, responding to Soviet espionage with calmness, rather than pushing to order the complete removal of Soviet spies rings. Also, until his death Roosevelt, never gave secret information of atomic bomb development to Russia, because he accepted the recommendations of his advisers and Churchill. This meant that until Russia displayed a desirable confidence toward the West, the United States and Great Britain should delay transmission of secret information on the atomic bomb. A double play and the recommendations of his advisers and Churchill are not enough to search Roosevelt's real intentions. The third and more important factor is the issue of American hegemony. When the end of war was near, the top leaders of the Roosevelt Administration began to analyze the postwar world order. Great Britain was no match for the United States because her economy had been totally damaged throughout the German aerial attacks and her effort for the war. As for Soviet Russia, in spite of her severe damages, it is inevitable that the Russian armies would occupy Central and Eastern Europe and her massive armies would threaten the national security of the United States. This kind of anti-Soviet atmosphere inside of Roosevelt Administration might have strongly influenced President Roosevelt to keep the secret information from Russia.
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.062 | 0.019 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it