Why this work is in the frame
A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.
Bibliographic record
Abstract
This paper considers the portfolio management problem for an investor with finite time horizon who is allowed to consume and take out life insurance. Natural assumptions, such as different discount rates for consumption and life insurance, lead to time inconsistency. This situation can also arise when the investor is in fact a group, the members of which have different utilities and/or different discount rates. As a consequence, the optimal strategies are not implementable. We focus on hyperbolic discounting, which has received much attention lately, especially in the area of behavioral finance. Following [I. Ekeland and T. A. Pirvu, Math. Financ. Econ., 2 (2008), pp. 57–86], we consider the resulting problem as a leader-follower game between successive selves, each of whom can commit for an infinitesimally small amount of time. We then define policies as subgame perfect equilibrium strategies. Policies are characterized by an integral equation which is shown to have a solution in the case of constant relative risk aversion utilities. Our results can be extended for more general preferences as long as the equations admit solutions. Numerical simulations reveal that for the Merton problem with hyperbolic discounting, the consumption increases up to a certain time, after which it decreases; this pattern does not occur in the case of exponential discounting and is therefore known in the literature as the “consumption puzzle.” Other numerical experiments explore the effect of time varying aggregation rate on the insurance premium.
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.001 | 0.005 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it