HERITAGE: OWNED OR ASSIGNED?

Abstract Teaching heritage language is regarded as an act of social justice, but under what conditions and in what context? This article examines the educational practice of introducing heritage language to Chinese return-migrant children and Japan-born Vietnamese children. The language programs under investigation are conducted in a community education center and in an after-school setting in a public elementary school in a multiethnic neighborhood in Osaka, Japan. This study demonstrates how the local community's practice of heritage language learning dissolves the boundaries among ethnic minorities, bringing together all participants and cutting across ethnic lines. The result is empowering, but with a limited effect. At the same time, the institutionalized practice of heritage language learning at school becomes a marker for ethnic minorities and is used to maintain the boundary between ethnic minorities and Japanese, despite official discourses of minority education for empowerment. Ethnographic data show discrepancies between the views of teachers and communities about what ethnic minorities should be like and what they are hoping to find in Japan. The politics of heritage involves the legitimization of power and distinction, as well as the exclusion of those who do not have access to heritage. Situating each case within the politics of heritage, schooling, and Japan's multicultural initiatives, this article examines what is legitimized and what is excluded through teaching and learning heritage language in both cases and discusses the implications of heritage language teaching for immigrant children in Japan. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to thank participants of my research who generously assisted me during my field research. My research in Japan was supported by the Sasakawa Scientific Research Grant from the Japan Science Society, the Center for Japanese Studies at the University of California, Berkeley, as well as by the postdoctoral fellowship of the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, National University of Singapore. I would like to thank Neriko Doerr, Robin DeLugan, Kiri Lee, Yuri Yamasaki, Michiyo Takato, Laura Miller, John Davis, and three anonymous reviewers for their feedback in revising this article. I also appreciate Nelson Graburn's advice and help in suggesting references on heritage over the course of this process. Finally, I would like to thank TomFenton, managing editor of Critical Asian Studies, for his professional editing and helpful suggestions. Notes 1. Moore et al. Citation2003. 2. Chambers Citation2005, 7. 3. Graburn Citation2001; Corsane Citation2005. 4. Graham, Gregory, and Tunbridge Citation2005. 5. Lowenthal Citation1994, 41. 6. Graburn Citation2001, 71. 7. Lowenthal Citation1994, 43. 8. Tunbridge and Ashworth Citation1996, 4. 9. Eidson Citation2005. 10. Graham, Gregory, and Tunbridge Citation2005, 34. 11. Eidson Citation2005, 558. 12. Graham, Gregory, and Tunbridge Citation2005, 34. 13. Fishman 1999 in Deusen-Scholl Citation2003, 216. Three centuries of heritage language education in the United States. Plenary address given at the First National Heritage Language Conference, Long Beach, Calif., in1999. 14. Nakajima Citation2003. 15. For example, according to Nakajima Citation(2003), heritage language is functional and creates all semantics for the first generation and bilingualism for the second generation; however, for the third generation, heritage language lacks a function and becomes a symbol of their cultural group. 16. Deusen-Scholl Citation2003. For a discussion of heritage language teaching in relation to the issues of identity and community, see He Citation(2006) and Carreira Citation(2004). 17. The research is based on ethnographic fieldwork in one multiethnic neighborhood in Osaka between September 1998 and March 2000, August and September 2001, May and June 2004, and July and August 2008. In particular, I examined the educational practices directed toward 1.5-generation Chinese and second-generation Vietnamese children in school and within their local community. I follow Zhou and Bankston Citation(1998) in using the term “1.5 generation” for those who arrived in the new society between the ages of five and twelve. 18. Eidson Citation2005. 19. Olwig Citation1999. 20. Ministry of Justice 2009. http://www.moj.go.jp/PRESS/090710-1/090710-1.html">http://www.moj.go.jp/PRESS/090710-1/090710-1.html (accessed 16 November 2009). 21. Ministry of Education 2009. http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/houdou/21/07/1279262.htm (accessed 16 November 2009). 22. Ota Citation2000. According to my search in 2008, the Ministry of Education further defines these children as “those who are not able to speak conversational Japanese adequately, and those who are in need of Japanese language instruction for lacking a language for learning (gakushū gengo) at their grade levels and for having difficulty in participating in learning (gakushū katsudō) despite their fluency in conversational Japanese. Even with these clarifications, the Ministry's focus as reflected in their policies is still on language, as Ota Citation(2000) rightly argues. Ministry of Education 2008. http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/houdou/19/08/07062955.htm (accessed 3 June 2008). 23. Castles and Miller Citation2003. 24. Komai Citation2006. 25. Ibid., 128. This is the notion of creating the culture of a nation-state merely composed of one ethnic group. 26. In this report, “multiculturalism and coexistence” (tabunka kyōsei) is defined as “the coexistence of people with different nationality and ethnicity as members of a local society, with an appreciation for cultural differences and an effort to create an equal relationship” (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications 2006, 6). 27. Yamawaki Citation2003. 28. Turner Citation1993; Goldberg Citation1994; Eller Citation1997; Kincheloe Citation2002. 29. Chapman Citation2006, 100-1. 30. Kajita et al. Citation2005, cited in Kato Citation2008. Being aware of this trend, Kato Citation(2008) suggests the limitations of policies of multiculturalism and coexistence (tabunka kyōsei) for assisting foreigners, and questions the notion from the perspective of “the person concerned” as an “individual,” and not as an object to be supported. 31. Povinelli Citation2002. 32. Banks Citation1995; Korn Citation2002. 33. Eldering Citation1996. 34. Ibid., 322. 35. Aoyama City Citation2003, 16; Aoyama City Citation2004. 36. Lie Citation2001; Oguma Citation1995; Graburn et al. Citation2008; Willis and Murphy-Shigematsu Citation2008. 37. Upham Citation1987, 79. 38. Araragi Citation2000; Tamanoi Citation2000; Tamanoi Citation2003. In 1972, then prime minister Kakuei Tanaka opened diplomatic relations with China. With the release of a joint statement by Japan and China, the search for Japanese in China began. They and their families began returning to Japan with the Japanese government's support. In 2007, the number of returnees from northeast China was 6,393 families, or 20,416 war-displaced Japanese and their children and grandchildren. These Japanese nationals and their descendants, who are Chinese nationals, are collectively referred to as “Chinese” in Japanese society. Following this practice, I refer to them as “Chinese” as well. http://www.kiko kusha-center.or.jp/kikokusha/kiko_jijo/chugoku/mhwdata/index_f.htm (accessed 11 June 2009). 39. The Japanese government approved the settlement of three refugees from Vietnam in 1978, and accepted additional refugees in 1979, even before the Japanese government ratified the International Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees in 1981. In 1979, Japan set the acceptable number of refugees from Indochina at 500; the number was enlarged to 3,000 in 1981, 5,000 in 1983, and 10,000 in 1985. The number of Vietnamese refugees who settled in Japan totaled 7,169 in 1994, when the government abolished this system. In 1980, the Japanese government started accepting family members of refugees under theODP(orderly departure program: family reunification immigration program). This program ended in 2004 (Kitayama Citation2004, 100-1). Toda Citation(2001) reports that approximately 70 percent of Vietnamese residents in 1999 were either permanent residents or settlers-those who reside in Japan as former refugees or their family members (Toda Citation2001, 2-3). 40. The number decreased after the war as some returned to Korea, but it has gradually increased again. Miyako 10-nen no Ayumi 1984, 29; interview with a researcher at HuRights Osaka, March 1999. 41. Information acquired at City Hall, Aoyama City, in 2008. Since government's studies and reports classify people according to their nationalities, Koreans, Chinese, and Vietnamese are those who hold nationality of each state. As Japanese nationality is based on descent under Japan's Nationality Law, those who were born in Japan are not necessarily Japanese nationals. Japanese in these reports also include naturalized Japanese of foreign descent. Vietnamese include recent immigrants, students, and Vietnamese trainees (kenshūsei). For a study of Vietnamese residents in Japan, see also Kawakami Citation(2001). As for Koreans in Aoyama, approximately 90 percent were special permanent residents, i.e., resident Koreans (zainichi). According to the latest figures available on Chinese returnees, in 2000, Chinese returnees constituted about 43 percent of Chinese in Aoyama City (Aoyama City Citation2003; Kaji Citation2008). 42. The government-assigned Dowa districts are the areas that are officially assigned for the Buraku special measures. Some Buraku communities received benefits of the Dowa special measures given Dowa districts, but not all. Dowa special measures will be explained in the next section. 43. Aoyama City Citation2001, 2, 3, 5, 24. 44. “The Localization of U.S. Multicultural Education in Japan.” Paper presented at the 2003 annual meeting of the American Anthropological Association in Chicago. 45. Yamawaki Citation(2003) argues that guidelines for foreigners developed by local government can be classified into three kinds-those with a focus on “human rights” exemplified by the ones for resident Koreans in Osaka City, those focused on “internationalization” such as the ones in Hamamatsu City in Shizuoka Prefecture, and the “integration” type such as the ones developed in Kawasaki City in Kanagawa Prefecture, which falls between the first two. 46. Between 1998 and 2008 I conducted formal interviews for from 30 to 120 minutes with 123 individuals in person and phone interviews with four others. Only two interviews were tape-recorded. 47. BLL, the Buraku grassroots political organization formed in 1955, demanded that central and local governments improve Buraku conditions (in what was known as the Buraku liberation movement). Their efforts resulted in policies geared toward solving the Buraku problem in the 1960s. These were made possible by the Special Measures Legislation (SML) of 1969 (Upham Citation1987; Neary Citation1997). 48. Buraku kaihō dōmei Ōsaka-fu rengōkai Citation1982, 4-18. 49. Tomoni did receive a budget allotment for social education under Dowa education. 50. Neary Citation1997. 51. Tomoni Citation2002. 52. See Tai Citation2006; Tomoni: http://tomoni.ld.infoseek.co.jp/kihon/soukai.htm (accessed 6 October 2007). Here, “Tomoni” is a pseudonym. 53. The Vietnamese language class for children was conducted mostly in Vietnamese, using excerpted materials from a Vietnamese language textbook printed in Vietnam. The course covered the Vietnamese alphabet, and taught students how to spell simple words that matched illustrations in the textbook and how to pronounce those words. 54. Ogawa Citation2008; Tomoni 2005. In the academic year 2006-2007, Tomoni received a grant of 200,000 yen (about US$2100) from the Osaka Community Foundation for heritage language classes. This was in addition to other activities offered for immigrant children and adults, such as assistance in studying and instruction in the Japanese language for immigrants. 55. Only two students of Korean background participated in the Korean ethnic club at Miyako Elementary School and three to four students of Korean background joined in Tomoni's activities for Koreans in 1998-2000 when approximately sixty students of Korean background lived in Miyako. 56. Ogawa Citation2008. Parentheses are added. For more information on Tomoni, see Tai Citation(2006) and Okubo Citation(2005), chapters 2, 3, and 7. 57. Tomoni 2005. Interview with the official of Tomoni in July 2008. 58. The latter was a common belief among teachers mainly in Osaka, who support immigrant children's speaking a language other than Japanese. Their thinking is based on Cummins's “Linguistic Interdependence Principle” (also discussed in Nakajima Citation2003). Teachers were made familiar with Cummins through workshops on second language teaching and learning held by the teachers' association for the education of foreign children in Osaka. 59. Schools reported the number of children who resided in the government-assigned Dowa districts as those who were in need of special assistance as members of the Buraku community, regardless of their family history and ethnic backgrounds. The official number included non- Buraku Japanese who moved into the government-assigned Dowa districts, as well as resident Koreans, Chinese, and Vietnamese in the districts. See note 42 for an explanation of the government- assigned Dowa districts. 60. By contrast, schools without minority communities generally offer Japanese language instruction only. The combining of ethnic club activities and Japanese language instruction is unique to areas with minority communities. Unpublished school report, Miyako Elementary School, 1995. Personal communication with a former Japanese language instructor at Miyako in August 2008. 61. “National” is for the formation of Japanese language classes, and “local” is for offering heritage language teaching/ethnic club activities. 62. In papers I presented in 2003 and 2007, I added “international influence” as another factor that contributed to the making of space for this type of education, e.g., Japan's adaptation of the UN-advocated concept of “human rights” and U.S.-style multicultural education. See “Learning the National Language, Performing Ethnic Cultures: Cultural Politics of Multicultural Education in Osaka, Japan.” Paper presented at the Canadian Anthropology Society and the American Ethnological Society Conference, Toronto, Canada, in 2007. See note 44 for the paper presented in 2003. 63. Teachers believed that the phrase was from the Ministry of Education; however, the Ministry has not acknowledged education for foreign children other than language instruction, as previously discussed. 64. Mori Citation1990; Minzokusabetsu to tatakau Ōsaka renraku kyōgikai Citation1992. 65. See Okubo Citation2005, chap. 4. 66. In a homeroom class of twenty-two children, two were Vietnamese and at least two were resident Koreans, along with one half-Japanese and half-Korean student. Regarding the number of the children with Korean background, the homeroom teacher said she could not ask each student and family; they needed to inform her themselves. From my field notes in December 1998. 67. From my field notes, January 2000. See Fukuoka and Kim Citation(1997), Kuraishi Citation(2007), and Lim Citation(2009) for discussions on names for resident Koreans. In particular, Lim Citation(2009) argues that names are the only markers that signal those of Korean origin for Japan-born Koreans educated in the Japanese school system. 68. Teachers and staff members of the Korean education center in the neighborhood told me that some of the Vietnamese and resident Korean students switched back to their Japanese names when they entered high school or the job market, despite their pledge to use their ethnic names. A 19 November article in Chosun Ilbo reports that 25.4 percent of those who are affiliated with Mindan (Korean Residents Union in Japan) use “only their Korean names.” Although this is higher than the 13.4 percent figure from the 2000 survey, the figure shows that the use of ethnic names is still not common among foreign residents in Japan. As those who are affiliated with the organization are more likely to use their ethnic names than ordinary resident Koreans, the percentage of those who use their Korean names against resident Koreans as a whole is assumed to be lower than 25.4 percent. http://www.chosunonline.com/news/200911190000 44 (accessed 22 November 2009). 69. Five more Vietnamese students were using their Japanese names in 2008. In addition, one person said she would start using her Japanese name after becoming a Japanese national. Interview conducted in August 2008 and from my field notes in August 2008. 70. From my field notes, November 1998. 71. Susuki 2010. 72. Morris-Suzuki Citation1998; Nukaga Citation2003; Chapman Citation2006. 73. As explained above, only two to four out of approximately sixty resident Korean children participated in the ethnic club activities designed for Koreans. 74. Yamasaki 2010; Doerr and Lee Citationforthcoming. 75. This practice goes together with Japanese teachers' tendency to overlook students' social backgrounds and to view each child as an individual (kojinka). In my field site, the institutional framework categorized children as “Japanese,” “Chinese,” or “Vietnamese.” (Koreans and the Buraku were also so categorized to a certain extent). Children, however, were viewed apart from the specific individual social background of each category. Shimizu (2002) argues that Japanese teachers tend not to consider social differences but rather to consider differences in academic performance by de-contextualizing, treating all children as equal, and reducing all phenomena to the capability or effort of the individual (2002, 87). 76. Hall Citation2006, 220. 77. Lie Citation2001, 81, 138-41, 170-72. 78. Hall Citation2006, 215. 79. Interview conducted in July 2008. 80. Farrer's study of a subculture of Chinese immigrants in Tokyo shows as well that the sociality of a space like Tomoni's-a sort of ethnic enclosure-facilitates the empowerment of individual participants. See Farrer Citation2004. 81. See Uchibori Citation1989. 82. Takamori forthcoming. 83. Sakai Citation2005 (1996).

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