¿Juicio político o golpe legislativo? Sobre las crisis constitucionales en los años noventa
Why this work is in the frame
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Bibliographic record
Abstract
RESUMEN: Este artículo analiza las crisis políticas que terminaron con los gobiernos de Fernando Collor en Brasil (1992), Carlos Andrés Pérez en Venezuela (1993), Abdalá Bucaram en Ecuador (1997) y Raúl Cubas Grau en Paraguay (1999) desde una perspectiva comparada. Los casos son utilizados como ejemplos similares, y las experiencias de Carlos Menem, Alberto Fujimori y Ernesto Samper son invocadas como fuentes de contraste. La evidencia sugiere que todo presidente corre el riesgo de ser depuesto por el Congreso cuando tres factores se conjugan en su contra: a) el escándalo político erosiona su autoridad; b) la opinión pública se moviliza en su contra —usualmente como resultado de una economía en crisis— y c) el Ejecutivo carece de recursos para controlar al Congreso. Tras estas condiciones normalmente se esconde un marcado aislamiento político del presidente y una fuerte oposición de las elites a su estilo de gobierno.ABSTRACT: This paper compares the political crises leading tu the demise of the administrations of Fernando Collor in Brazil (1992), Carlos Andrés Pérez in Venezuela (1993), Abdalá Bucaram in Ecuador (1997) and Raul Cubas Grau in Paraguay (1999). Those cases are compared in terms of their similarities, and the administrations of Carlos Menem, Alberto Fujimori and Ernesto Samper are invoked as a source of differences. The evidence suggests that presidents are likely to be impeached whenever three factors act in conjunction: a) political scandal erodes presidential authority; b) public opinion is mobilized against the president —typically as the result of an economy in crisis; and c) the chief executive lacks resources to control congress. Underlying these forces, there is usually a marked isolation of the president and strong elite opposition to his or her style of government.
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Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it