A Reputation–Oriented Reinforcement Learning Strategy for Agents in Electronic Marketplaces
Why this work is in the frame
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Bibliographic record
Abstract
In this paper, we propose a reputation–oriented reinforcement learning algorithm for buying and selling agents in electronic market environments. We take into account the fact that multiple selling agents may offer the same good with different qualities. In our approach, buying agents learn to avoid the risk of purchasing low–quality goods and to maximize their expected value of goods by dynamically maintaining sets of reputable sellers. Selling agents learn to maximize their expected profits by adjusting product prices and by optionally altering the quality of their goods. Modeling the reputation of sellers allows buying agents to focus on those sellers with whom a certain degree of trust has been established. We also include the ability for buying agents to optionally explore the marketplace in order to discover new reputable sellers. As detailed in the paper, we believe that our proposed strategy leads to improved satisfaction for buyers and sellers, reduced communication load, and robust systems. In addition, we present preliminary experimental results that confirm some potential advantages of the proposed algorithm, and outline planned future experimentation to continue the evaluation of the model.
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Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it