On European Electricity Market Liberalization: A Game-Theoretic Approach
Bibliographic record
Abstract
In this paper, we deal with the European electricity market liberalization problem, formulated as a game with electricity producers as players, while the consumers' electricity demand is exogenous. The producers maximize their profit by choosing how much electricity they will produce individually by means of electricity production available to them. The aim of the research presented in this paper is to investigate the differences between the resulting electricity prices with different scenarios: a market with one Stackelberg leading producer, a market with two Stackelberg leading producers being noncooperative among themselves, and a perfectly competitive market. In the case studies the games involving one, two, and eight European countries are played. In the scenarios dealt with in this paper the perfectly competitive market yields the lowest electricity prices for the consumers. However, we also discuss possible drawbacks of liberalization. Our research aims to help understanding the complex process of electricity market liberalization.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.003 | 0.005 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.003 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.003 | 0.004 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Research integrity | 0.003 | 0.002 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.005 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".