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Record W1993884221 · doi:10.1136/bmj.d108

Effect of pay for performance on the management and outcomes of hypertension in the United Kingdom: interrupted time series study

2011· article· en· W1993884221 on OpenAlexaff
Brian Serumaga, Dennis Ross‐Degnan, Anthony Avery, Rachel Elliott, Sumit R. Majumdar, F. Zhang, S B Soumerai

Bibliographic record

VenueBMJ · 2011
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldHealth Professions
TopicPrimary Care and Health Outcomes
Canadian institutionsUniversity of Alberta
Fundersnot available
KeywordsMedicineBlood pressureInterrupted time seriesConfidence intervalInterrupted Time Series AnalysisIncidence (geometry)IncentiveCumulative incidencePay for performanceEmergency medicineInternal medicinePediatricsNursingPsychological intervention

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

OBJECTIVE: To assess the impact of a pay for performance incentive on quality of care and outcomes among UK patients with hypertension in primary care. DESIGN: Interrupted time series. SETTING: The Health Improvement Network (THIN) database, United Kingdom. PARTICIPANTS: 470 725 patients with hypertension diagnosed between January 2000 and August 2007. INTERVENTION: The UK pay for performance incentive (the Quality and Outcomes Framework), which was implemented in April 2004 and included specific targets for general practitioners to show high quality care for patients with hypertension (and other diseases). MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Centiles of systolic and diastolic blood pressures over time, rates of blood pressure monitoring, blood pressure control, and treatment intensity at monthly intervals for baseline (48 months) and 36 months after the implementation of pay for performance. Cumulative incidence of major hypertension related outcomes and all cause mortality for subgroups of newly treated (treatment started six months before pay for performance) and treatment experienced (started treatment in year before January 2001) patients to examine different stages of illness. RESULTS: After accounting for secular trends, no changes in blood pressure monitoring (level change 0.85, 95% confidence interval -3.04 to 4.74, P=0.669 and trend change -0.01, -0.24 to 0.21, P=0.615), control (-1.19, -2.06 to 1.09, P=0.109 and -0.01, -0.06 to 0.03, P=0.569), or treatment intensity (0.67, -1.27 to 2.81, P=0.412 and 0.02, -0.23 to 0.19, P=0.706) were attributable to pay for performance. Pay for performance had no effect on the cumulative incidence of stroke, myocardial infarction, renal failure, heart failure, or all cause mortality in both treatment experienced and newly treated subgroups. CONCLUSIONS: Good quality of care for hypertension was stable or improving before pay for performance was introduced. Pay for performance had no discernible effects on processes of care or on hypertension related clinical outcomes. Generous financial incentives, as designed in the UK pay for performance policy, may not be sufficient to improve quality of care and outcomes for hypertension and other common chronic conditions.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.012
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.059
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Observational · Consensus signal: Observational
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.028
Threshold uncertainty score0.065

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0120.059
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0010.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.002
Bibliometrics0.0010.002
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0020.001
Open science0.0010.001
Research integrity0.0010.002
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0020.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.150
GPT teacher head0.423
Teacher spread0.273 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designObservational
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations296
Published2011
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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