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Record W1999059336 · doi:10.1016/j.rfe.2011.10.001

The effect of leverage on the tax‐cut versus investment‐subsidy argument

2011· article· en· W1999059336 on OpenAlex

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

affAt least one author lists a Canadian institution in the pinned OpenAlex snapshot.

Bibliographic record

VenueReview of Financial Economics · 2011
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
TopicFiscal Policy and Economic Growth
Canadian institutionsMcMaster University
Fundersnot available
KeywordsSubsidyEconomicsLeverage (statistics)Investment (military)IncentiveTax incentiveTax creditDebtAd valorem taxMonetary economicsPublic economicsMicroeconomicsTax reformBusinessFinanceMarket economy

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Abstract Two common methods of attracting corporate investment are investment incentives and tax incentives. It is important to use the two incentives in the correct proportions, otherwise the government will give up too much value in the process of attracting investment. This paper examines the effect of tax cut and investment subsidy on the government's net benefit from a project. Earlier studies concluded that it was optimal to use only investment subsidy and no tax cuts. We show that this is not true when debt financing is possible, and it is generally optimal (from the government's perspective) to use a combination of tax reduction and investment subsidy. The optimal tax rate and optimal investment subsidy are identified and analyzed in the paper. It is shown that using a sub‐optimal combination of incentives can result in substantial reduction of benefits for the government.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.002
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.001
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.723
Threshold uncertainty score0.720

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0020.001
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0010.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.048
GPT teacher head0.227
Teacher spread0.179 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it