Agency Cost Reduction Associated with EU Financial Reporting Reform
Why this work is in the frame
A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.
Bibliographic record
Abstract
We predict and find that regulations expected to harmonize and strengthen firms' financial reporting in the European Union (EU) in the early 2000s increase Tobin's Q ratios of firms with high agency costs due to (1) concentration of control (entrenchment) and (2) an excess of the largest shareholder's voting rights over cash flow rights. These results are consistent with stronger reporting standards enhancing firm value by mitigating incentives for controlling shareholders to expropriate minority shareholders. Increases in Tobin's Q associated with financial reporting reform are concentrated in EU firms that (1) are not cross-listed in the U.S., (2) have families as their largest shareholders, or (3) have a largest shareholder who holds 20 percent or more of the firm's cash flow rights. These results suggest that minority shareholders of firms with the most severe perceived information asymmetries are among the major beneficiaries of EU financial reporting reform.
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Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.004 | 0.006 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.003 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it