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Record W2006709587 · doi:10.1109/pst.2010.5593251

You are the key: Generating cryptographic keys from voice biometrics

2010· article· en· W2006709587 on OpenAlex

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

affAt least one author lists a Canadian institution in the pinned OpenAlex snapshot.

Bibliographic record

Venuenot available
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldComputer Science
TopicBiometric Identification and Security
Canadian institutionsUniversity of Ottawa
Fundersnot available
KeywordsComputer scienceBiometricsCryptographyEntropy (arrow of time)PopulationTheoretical computer scienceSpeech recognitionComputer security

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

In this work we apply randomized biometric templates (RBTs) to voice biometrics by performing an experiment using speech samples from the TI46 database. Additionally, we present a novel algorithm for extracting reliable features from voice biometrics and analyze the resulting entropy of the cryptographic keys generated by the RBT algorithm. We evaluate our implementation by analyzing the number of guesses required by a powerful adversary to generate a user's cryptographic key when given access to the user's decrypted template and population statistics. Furthermore, we compare our results to the results of prior work. We demonstrate that RBTs are able to generate cryptographic keys with at least 30 bits of entropy for 36% of the population and at least 40 bits of entropy for 7% of the population, while keys generated using prior work only contain at least 20 bits of entropy for 19% of the population. We also demonstrate that RBT generated keys are able to achieve a maximum entropy of 51 bits, while keys generated using prior work are only able to achieve a maximum entropy of 26 bits.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Not applicable · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.557
Threshold uncertainty score0.754

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0010.008
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0010.000
Open science0.0020.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.025
GPT teacher head0.244
Teacher spread0.219 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Quick stats

Citations20
Published2010
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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