Why this work is in the frame
A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Real-world large-scale Peer-to-Peer (P2P) Video-on-Demand (VoD) streaming applications face more design challenges as compared to P2P live streaming, due to higher peer dynamics and less buffer overlap. The situation is further complicated when we consider the selfish nature of peers, who in general wish to download more and upload less, unless otherwise motivated. Taking a new perspective of distributed dynamic auctions, we design efficient P2P VoD streaming algorithms with simultaneous consideration of peer incentives and streaming optimality. In our solution, media block exchanges among peers are carried out through local auctions, in which budget-constrained peers bid for desired blocks from their neighbors, which in turn deliver blocks to the winning bidders and collect revenue. With strategic design of a discriminative second price auction with seller reservation, a supplying peer has full incentive to maximally contribute its bandwidth to increase its budget; requesting peers are also motivated to bid in such a way that optimal media block scheduling is achieved effectively in a fully decentralized fashion. Applying techniques from convex optimization and mechanism design, we prove (a) the incentive compatibility at the selling and buying peers, and (b) the optimality of the induced media block scheduling in terms of social welfare maximization. Large-scale empirical studies are conducted to investigate the behavior of the proposed auction mechanisms in dynamic P2P VoD systems based on real-world settings.
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.002 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.002 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.003 | 0.001 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.002 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it