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Record W2012194644 · doi:10.1177/0886368705277654

Exploring the Links between Performance Appraisals and Pay Satisfaction

2005· article· en· W2012194644 on OpenAlex

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

affAt least one author lists a Canadian institution in the pinned OpenAlex snapshot.

Bibliographic record

VenueCompensation & Benefits Review · 2005
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldBusiness, Management and Accounting
TopicJob Satisfaction and Organizational Behavior
Canadian institutionsMcMaster UniversityYork University
Fundersnot available
KeywordsJob satisfactionAbsenteeismBusinessCompensation (psychology)TurnoverEmployee researchPay for performanceSample (material)Work (physics)PsychologyMarketingOrganizational commitmentSocial psychologyIncentiveManagementEconomicsMicroeconomics

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Pay satisfaction is a key goal of an organization’s reward system because it affects employee behaviors and organizational outcomes, such as job satisfaction, turnover, absenteeism, work stoppages, and employee performance. Given limited resources and a finite ability to increase pay, how can organizations increase employee satisfaction with their compensation? This article examines the effects of performance appraisals on pay satisfaction. Using a sample of more than 15,000 employees, we found that pay satisfaction is the highest when performance pay is tied to the employee’s performance and the lowest when there are no performance appraisals in organizations, even if there is performance pay. Implications for management are discussed.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.000
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesInsufficient payload (model declined to judge)
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Observational · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.720
Threshold uncertainty score1.000

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.002
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.001

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.096
GPT teacher head0.273
Teacher spread0.177 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it