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Record W2019586736 · doi:10.1002/agr.10019

Effects of state regulations on marketing margins and price transmission asymmetry: Evidence from the New York City and upstate New York fluid milk markets

2002· article· en· W2019586736 on OpenAlex

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

affAt least one author lists a Canadian institution in the pinned OpenAlex snapshot.

Bibliographic record

VenueAgribusiness · 2002
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
TopicEconomics of Agriculture and Food Markets
Canadian institutionsAgriculture and Agri-Food Canada
FundersUniversity of Connecticut
KeywordsEconLitEconomicsLegislatureState (computer science)Agricultural economicsMarketingBusinessLaw

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Abstract A marketing margin model that allows testing for constant returns to scale technology and asymmetric marketing costs and farm price transmissions is proposed. Results indicate that a constant returns to scale technology cannot be rejected. During the period prior to the enactment of the price gouging law in June 1991 by the New York State Legislature, significant short‐run and long‐run asymmetries in both marketing costs and farm price transmissions were identified. After 1991, these asymmetries were no longer significant or were reduced substantially. Finally, the legislative change that occurred in 1987, allowing Farmland Dairies' entry into the New York City fluid milk market, contributed significantly to reducing marketing margins in the New York City fluid milk market. [EconLit Citations: D400, C300] © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Observational · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.740
Threshold uncertainty score0.921

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.027
GPT teacher head0.189
Teacher spread0.163 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it