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Record W2027953836 · doi:10.1353/nin.2001.0053

The Money Pitch: Baseball Free Agency and Salary Arbitration (review)

2001· article· en· W2027953836 on OpenAlex

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

venuePublished in a venue whose home country is Canada.
no affNo Canadian affiliation: this work is invisible to an affiliation-only frame.
No Canadian affiliation. An affiliation-only frame, the usual design, would never have seen this work. It is one of the works that make the case for inverting the frame.

Bibliographic record

VenueNine · 2001
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldArts and Humanities
TopicAmerican Sports and Literature
Canadian institutionsnot available
Fundersnot available
KeywordsSalaryArbitrationNegotiationAgency (philosophy)LeagueCollective bargainingLawPolitical scienceEconomicsSociologySocial science

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Reviewed by: The Money Pitch: Baseball Free Agency and Salary Arbitration James W. Eaton (bio) Roger I. Abrams . The Money Pitch: Baseball Free Agency and Salary Arbitration. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1999. 218pp. Cloth, $27.50. "Negotiating a salary may not be as much fun as hitting a home run, but it is as much a part of the game," writes Northeastern University law professor Roger Abrams. Drawing upon his legal background, his experience as a Major League salary arbitrator, and principles of economics and game theory, Abrams explains that Major League salaries depend on talent and performance, bargaining status, and negotiating ability. He describes actual cases, including Ty Cobb, Babe Ruth, Bernie Williams, and Mo Vaughn, as well as imaginary negotiations between Roy Hobbs and the New York Knights. These illustrations of bargaining strategy and tactics make for informative and enjoyable reading. Unlike most labor unions, the Major League Baseball Players Association does not negotiate specific pay levels or job security for its members. Instead, [End Page 160]it bargains with team owners to set a league-wide minimumsalary, guarantee eligible players the right to salary arbitration and free agency, and specify rules and procedures for implementing these salary-determination mechanisms. Within these collectively negotiated parameters, players compete for positions and individually negotiate salaries. Baseball's traditional reserve system restricts a player early in his career to negotiating solely with his current team, severely curtailing his bargaining power. Once eligible for salary arbitration, his salary will be based at least in part on the earnings of similar players on other teams. Free agency allows a player to negotiate with all teams, widening his range of bargaining options and letting market forces set his pay. Binding final-offer salary arbitration resolves a negotiating impasse by submitting a player's salary request and his team's offer to an outside arbitrator. The arbitrator must choose either the player's figure or the team's, a feature designed to encourage the parties to submit reasonable figures and continue efforts to reach a settlement. Arbitration decisions may not be based on a team's financial condition. This fosters pay comparability across teams for players of similar caliber and makes the labor market national rather than local. Besides providing a wealth of details about player eligibility, deadlines, conduct and content of arbitration hearings, and criteria to be considered by the arbitrator, Abrams also offers thoughtful insights and suggestions for improving the process. He sees shorter and more focused presentations by each side as more desirable than the existing information overload. Arbitrators should either be given the evidence in advance of the hearing or be allowed more than twenty-four hours afterward to sift through it. Most statistics presented by both sides poorly measure a player's contribution to his team. Abrams considers run production, slugging average with men on base, and opponents' batting average the best indicators of players' values. He laments that reliance on statistics assigns unmeasurable player qualities, such as leadership and hustle, a negligible role in arbitration decisions. Abrams's comments on the use of statistics in arbitration hearings may be well founded, but they also suggest suspicion of statistical evidence in general. He adopts the guideline Albert Spalding gave to editors of his Official Baseball Guide: "Keep the book free of statistics as much as possible." Some troublesome flaws of The Money Pitchmay be unfortunate consequences of this choice. The book contains numerous unsubstantiated claims. For example, Abrams opines that free agency has been great for the game, without identifying the criteria for judging this and presenting the data required to assess those criteria. Furthermore, poor documentation mars the book. It lacks citations for direct quotes and specific research findings. A brief endnote section follows the text, but notes are not numbered and keyed to specific text statements. [End Page 161]The bibliography does not incorporate journal articles and contains notable omissions from accessible published works on the economics and business of baseball. A particular letdown is Abrams's discussion of his personal experiences as an arbitrator. After hearing their cases in 1986, he decided in favor of Brett Butler and against Ron Darling, but he provides...

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.000
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesInsufficient payload (model declined to judge)
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Not applicable · Consensus signal: Not applicable
GenreCandidate signal: Other · Consensus signal: Other
Teacher disagreement score0.107
Threshold uncertainty score0.981

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0200.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.014
GPT teacher head0.213
Teacher spread0.199 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it