“Say on Pay”: A Wolf in Sheep's Clothing?
Why is this work in the frame?
A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.
Full frame distilled prediction
Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
- Candidate categories
- none
- Consensus categories
- none
- Domain
- Candidate signal: noneConsensus signal: none
- Study design
- Candidate signal: ObservationalConsensus signal: none
- Genre
- Candidate signal: EmpiricalConsensus signal: Empirical
- Teacher disagreement score
- 0.771
- Threshold uncertainty score
- 0.749
- Validation status
machine_predicted_unvalidated·codex-gemma-dda1882f352a
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.002 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
- Teacher spread
- 0.229 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
- Validation status
score_only:v0-immature-baseline· verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it
Abstract
Executive Overview This paper debates whether “Say on Pay” can fix executive pay. We argue that Say on Pay benefits executive pay when shareholders' voice offsets CEO power and mitigates directors' information deficiencies. We warn, however, that Say on Pay may raise two novel problems. First, executive pay may harm stakeholders whose interests differ from those of shareholders influential in pay setting. Second, boards may resist shareholders' intervention in pay setting and, as a result, manage compensation disclosures to ensure a passing shareholder vote. Consequently, Say on Pay may not only fail to remedy suboptimal pay but also legitimize it.
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
The record
- Venue
- Academy of Management Perspectives
- Topic
- Corporate Finance and Governance
- Field
- Business, Management and Accounting
- Canadian institutions
- Concordia University
- Funders
- not available
- Keywords
- Executive compensationShareholderHarmCompensation (psychology)BusinessClothingPay for performancePower (physics)AccountingEconomicsMarketingFinanceCorporate governanceLawIncentiveMicroeconomicsPolitical sciencePsychology
- Has abstract in OpenAlex
- yes