Moral typecasting: Divergent perceptions of moral agents and moral patients.
Why is this work in the frame?
A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.
No Canadian affiliation. An affiliation-only frame — the usual design — would never have seen this work. It is one of the works that make the case for inverting the frame.
Machine scores (provisional)
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
- Teacher spread
- 0.159 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
- Validation status
score_only:v0-immature-baseline· verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it
Abstract
Moral agency is the capacity to do right or wrong, whereas moral patiency is the capacity to be a target of right or wrong. Through 7 studies, the authors explored moral typecasting-an inverse relation between perceptions of moral agency and moral patiency. Across a range of targets and situations, good- and evil-doers (moral agents) were perceived to be less vulnerable to having good and evil done to them. The recipients of good and evil (moral patients), in turn, were perceived as less capable of performing good or evil actions. Moral typecasting stems from the dyadic nature of morality and explains curious effects such as people's willingness to inflict greater pain on those who do good than those who do nothing.
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
The record
- Venue
- Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
- Topic
- Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
- Field
- Neuroscience
- Canadian institutions
- —
- Funders
- National Institute of Mental HealthSocial Sciences and Humanities Research Council of CanadaInstitute for Humane Studies, George Mason University
- Keywords
- MoralityPsychologyMoral disengagementSocial psychologyMoral agencySocial cognitive theory of moralityMoral developmentMoral psychologyMoral reasoningAgency (philosophy)PerceptionMoral authorityNothingEpistemologyPhilosophy
- Has abstract in OpenAlex
- yes