Chimeras and "Human Dignity"

One argument Jason Scott Robert and Francoise Baylis (2003) do not make in their article on the creation of interspecies chimeras using human cellular material is that the creation of these chimeras would, or could, offend human dignity. Yet, human dignity is one of the most common concerns raised in public debates, academic arguments (Annas, Andrews, and Isasi 2002), and policy documents1 regarding biotechnology in general, and the creation of nonhuman-human chimeras in particular. Indeed, the Second World Conference on Bioethics in 2002 afŽrmed a “Universal Commitment to the Dignity of the Human Being,” stating “that full dignity is an attribute of humankind, and that its recognition is a fundamental right of each and every individual which must be respected and protected” (II World Conference on Bioethics 2002). The term might be absent from Robert and Baylis’s discussion for a number of reasons, including that concerns about human dignity are captured by other arguments they address in their paper or because they feel that the term is too nebulous to be of use. It is true that the concept is ill-deŽned within bioethics and that it therefore risks being dismissed as meaningless or uselessly vague. However, this lack of deŽnition should not yet cause us to abandon or ignore human dignity. At least in arguments about creating chimeras, an examination of what might be meant by appeals to human dignity can uncover important concerns or arguments that are not captured by other formulations of the debate. “Human dignity” is not the Žrst term to have been coded for our most fundamental values and yet to have evaded clear deŽnition. Plato tells us about a young Athenian, Euthyphro, who pressed charges against his own father. Euthyphro’s father had detained a servant after the servant killed one of the family’s slaves in a drunken rage. The servant was left tied up while Euthyphro’s father decided what to do with him. The servant died of hunger and cold during his detention, and Euthyphro took it upon himself to bring charges against his own father. His outraged family argued that prosecuting one’s own father is impious. Euthyphro countered that piety demands prosecuting wrongdoers, whoever they are. In a matter of life and death each side appeals to this fundamental Greek value, piety (hosion). Of course, with Plato as narrator, Socrates is never far from the action. Outside the court Socrates quizzes Euthyphro about his reasons for pressing charges. Euthyphro is convinced that piety obliges prosecuting. But in the ensuing conversation, Euthyphro fails in every attempt to say what piety amounts to, until he Žnally excuses himself. However, as a result of this debate we are left with more than a destabilized concept, because by following Socrates as he expertly interrogates the concept we learn something about piety, even as it remains undeŽned (Plato 1975). A few years later, despite being still short a deŽnition, Socrates calls on piety himself when faced with his own jury. Aware that he might evade execution through different testimony, Socrates responds, “do not deem it right for me, gentlemen of the jury, that I should act toward you in a way that I do not consider to be good or just or pious” (Plato 1975, 35c-d). The deŽnition’s evasiveness does not force Socrates to abandon this fundamental value, but obliges an earnest inquiry into what the term means. We should attempt this same kind of analysis with the term human dignity, considering what it might code for and uncovering the values or arguments that it encompasses. In Robert and Baylis’s context of creating interspecies chimeras using human cellular material, the term human dignity might refer to at least two different levels of concern: concerns about the individual chimera and our resultant obligations to it; and concerns about how our collective sense(s) of humanity might be challenged by the intentional creation of beings of compromised or partial humanness. Like Socrates’ dissection, understanding what human dignity might demand at each of these levels might provide some much-needed substance to the term human dignity and help explain the unease Robert and Baylis have identiŽed about the creation of nonhumanhuman chimeras. Robert and Baylis focus on the possibility that people Žnd (or would Žnd) the creation of chimeras objectionable because it involves crossing species boundaries. That is, they suppose that the very act of transgressing these boundaries to create a chimera is what causes the offense. However, if we frame our possible objection to chimeras in terms of individual human dignity rather than boundary crossing, we might see that it is perhaps not the muddling of species so much as the possible nature of the resultant part-human chimera that causes some (although probably not all) of the concern. That is, we might not know how to deŽne species, we might not believe in any particular Žxed boundary between human beings and nonhuman beings, Open Peer Commentaries

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