The Effects of Incentives on Information Exchange and Decision Quality in Groups
Why this work is in the frame
A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.
Bibliographic record
Abstract
ABSTRACT: This study uses an experiment to examine the effects of different compensation contracts (flat wage, group incentive, and noncompetitive individual incentive) on decision quality when information is distributed among different individuals. The results indicate that information exchange and decision quality are better under the group incentive than the individual incentive, even when both incentives provide an economic motivation for information exchange. Information exchange and decision quality are also better under the flat wage than the individual incentive, despite the stronger economic motivation for information exchange under the individual incentive. Analyses indicate that the effect of compensation contracts on decision quality is partially mediated through information exchange between group members. The results are consistent with higher group membership saliency under the group incentive and the flat wage than the individual incentive, and group membership saliency promoting information exchange between group members. The results also suggest that in a group decision-making context, differences in decision quality across compensation contracts may be better explained by psychological factors rather than economic factors.
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Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.006 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it