The Zimbabwean People's Army moment in Zimbabwean history, 1975–1977: Mugabe's rise and democracy's demise

AbstractThis article provides a historical analysis of Robert Mugabe's rise to power in the fractious hierarchy of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), in part by crushing all opposition and manipulating regional and international actors – including British, American and Mozambican political leaders – into supporting his claims to leadership. It also tells an often-ignored story of internal political struggle during the liberation war involving a small group of young political soldiers, the Zimbabwean People's Army (ZIPA), which challenged the policies, practices and ideology of the 'old guard' and tried to unify ZANU and Zimbabwe African People's Union, the country's two nationalist movements at the time. Drawing on interviews and extensive archival data, the article argues that ideology was central to this political struggle; ZIPA embraced a more radical and potentially more democratic vision for the liberation movement and for the future of the country. What kind of regime might have been consolidated in post-independent Zimbabwe if ZIPA had succeeded in unifying the country's national liberation movement and pushing them into the political direction ZIPA desired? This will never be known. By 1977, less than two years after the group emerged, its leaders were imprisoned in Mozambique's jails where they would remain until just prior to Zimbabwe's first democratic election in 1980.Keywords: ZimbabweZANUZIPAliberation wardemocracy Note on contributorDavid Moore is a professor of Development Studies at the University of Johannesburg and has taught in Canada, Australia and at the University of KwaZulu-Natal in South Africa. He has published more than 25 articles and book chapters on Zimbabwe, and others on African political economy and development theory. He has co-edited Debating Development Discourse with Gerald Schmitz (1995) and edited The World Bank: Development, Poverty, Hegemony (2007). In 2012 he co-edited a special edition of the Journal of Contemporary African Studies on 'progress' in Zimbabwe, with Norma Kriger and Brian Raftopoulos. He can be contacted at: dbmoore@uj.ac.za. Notes1. Until 1976 the Zimbabwe African National Union's acronym was 'ZANU'. That year, it and the ZAPU formed a united front – the Patriotic Front – for negotiating purposes. In spite of various splits and forced unities since then, the name 'ZANU-PF' remains.2. The geopolitical territory now called Zimbabwe was called 'Southern Rhodesia' and later 'Rhodesia' during the colonial and minority rule period. 'Zimbabwe' was the name used by the liberation movements. This article will use 'Rhodesia' when discussing the state against which the African nationalists were fighting.3. The original Mgagao Declaration was written by military officers at the ZANLA training Camp, Tanzania, October 1975.4. Nkomo was misleading Rowlands. ZIPA was in fact arguing that the Zimbabwean politicians should attend Geneva as a single group to stymie Smith's efforts to divide and rule, and they did not want to be seen to be with Mugabe alone (Mhanda Interview, August 2004).5. In early 2010 the author attempted, unsuccessfully, to contact Solarz. Solarz died in November 2010. Further archival evidence indicates Henry Kissinger (Citation1977) did not share Solarz's impressions of Mugabe: in the handover routine in January 1977 as Cy Vance took over as Secretary of State for the Jimmy Carter regime, Kissinger opined that Mugabe wasout of control. … absolutely untrustworthy. … If I could have picked someone from the beginning, it would have been Nkomo. … Nkomo is the best. What I don't understand is, is he just a figurehead for Mugabe or does he have power of his own?Kissinger did state, however, that Mugabe had 'some control' over the guerrillas, thus again indicating that Mugabe had convinced key diplomats of his status vis-à-vis ZIPA.6. Frank Wisner Jr. asserted that NIEs merelyprovide the background to a policy issue that is under debate. They give the scenery, like a play. They're not policy documents: they bring together all of the intelligence available to the United States from various intelligence agencies … because they [address an issue] does not mean that was on the agenda of issues to be addressed by policy makers. (Author interview, 19 November 2013, Washington DC)From mid-1976 through to the early months of the Carter administration, Wisner was responsible for the State Department's office of Southern African affairs in the Bureau of African Affairs and sent by Kissinger to the Geneva conference to 'shadow and support the British effort'.7. In interviews ZIPA-vashandi leaders confirm approaching the Soviet embassy in Maputo with their plans for unity, and receiving an enthusiastic response. American and/or British intelligence may well have picked this up.8. Wisner (interview, November 19, 2013) put it thus: 'I can tell you no policy maker in Washington was thinking about the interstices of the Zimbabwean rebel military forces: this was not on anybody's screen'.

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