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Do Managers Withhold Bad News?

2008· article· en· 225 citations· W2057287787 on OpenAlex· 10.1111/j.1475-679x.2008.00318.x

Why is this work in the frame?

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

Canadian affiliationAn author listed a Canadian institution. This is the only route the usual frame has.

Full frame distilled prediction

Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

Candidate categories
Metaresearch, Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)
Consensus categories
none
Domain
Candidate signal: noneConsensus signal: none
Study design
Candidate signal: Not applicableConsensus signal: none
Genre
Candidate signal: EmpiricalConsensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score
0.476
Threshold uncertainty score
1.000
Validation status
machine_predicted_unvalidated · codex-gemma-dda1882f352a

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0050.016
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0010.002
Science and technology studies0.0010.000
Scholarly communication0.0010.003
Open science0.0010.001
Research integrity0.0000.002
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0010.001

Machine scores (provisional)

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Opus teacher head0.041
GPT teacher head0.299
Teacher spread
0.258 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation status
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Abstract

ABSTRACT In this study, we examine whether managers delay disclosure of bad news relative to good news. If managers accumulate and withhold bad news up to a certain threshold, but leak and immediately reveal good news to investors, then we expect the magnitude of the negative stock price reaction to bad news disclosures to be greater than the magnitude of the positive stock price reaction to good news disclosures. We present evidence consistent with this prediction. Our analysis suggests that management, on average , delays the release of bad news to investors.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

The record

Venue
Journal of Accounting Research
Topic
Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance
Field
Business, Management and Accounting
Canadian institutions
Quest University Canada
Funders
not available
Keywords
Stock priceBusinessStock (firearms)News mediaActuarial scienceMonetary economicsAdvertisingAccountingEconomicsHistory
Has abstract in OpenAlex
yes