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Buy‐out prices in auctions: seller competition and multi‐unit demands

2008· article· en· W2058883788 on OpenAlexaff
René Kirkegaard, Per Baltzer Overgaard

Bibliographic record

VenueThe RAND Journal of Economics · 2008
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldDecision Sciences
TopicAuction Theory and Applications
Canadian institutionsBrock University
Fundersnot available
KeywordsCommon value auctionMicroeconomicsMultiunit auctionRevenueRevenue equivalenceVickrey auctionEnglish auctionCompetition (biology)Product (mathematics)Dutch auctionForward auctionEconomicsIncentiveBusinessVickrey–Clarke–Groves auctionAuction theoryFinance

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Online auction sites often enable sellers to add a buy‐out price. In one‐shot auctions, this has been motivated by appeal to impatience or risk aversion. We offer additional justification in a dynamic model, by showing that an early seller has an incentive to use a buy‐out price, if a similar product is offered later by another seller, and bidders desire multiple objects. Revenue in the first auction increases, but revenue in the second auction decreases, as does the sum of revenues. The buy‐out price causes the auction sequence to become inefficient, because the first item may be awarded to a bidder who should have received none.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.008
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.035
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.016
Threshold uncertainty score0.053

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0080.035
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0010.002
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0030.002
Bibliometrics0.0010.001
Science and technology studies0.0020.005
Scholarly communication0.0070.013
Open science0.0040.003
Research integrity0.0060.006
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0160.001

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.215
GPT teacher head0.362
Teacher spread0.147 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations40
Published2008
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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