Does Pay‐for‐Performance Strain the Employment Relationship? The Effect of Manager Bonus Eligibility on Nonmanagement Employee Turnover
Why this work is in the frame
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Bibliographic record
Abstract
We tested the organization‐level effects of manager pay‐for‐performance practices on nonmanagement employee turnover within the context of agency theory and equity theory—two frameworks commonly applied to understand compensation policy and practice. We also propose an alternative theoretical perspective that predicts that managerial pay‐for‐performance policies may strain the employment relationship and increase nonmanagement employee turnover, unless there are HR practices that train and incentivize managers to treat employees well. We compare these alternative models to establish how well each framework explains the observed effects. Agency theory and equity theory receive limited empirical support in our lagged panel data set of organizations, whereas broader empirical support is established for the strain effect of manager pay‐for‐performance on the employment relationship. We discuss the implications of our findings for compensation theory, research, and practice.
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Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.002 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it