MétaCan
Menu
Back to cohort
Record W2086088690 · doi:10.1017/s0021223711000021

Is There Ever a ‘Right to One's Own Law’? An Exploration of Possible Rights Foundations for Legal Pluralism

2012· article· en· W2086088690 on OpenAlexaff
Frédéric Megret

Bibliographic record

VenueIsrael Law Review · 2012
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldSocial Sciences
TopicHuman Rights and Development
Canadian institutionsMcGill University
Fundersnot available
KeywordsLegal pluralismPolitical scienceHuman rightsFundamental rightsReservation of rightsLawPluralism (philosophy)Law and economicsInternational human rights lawAutonomyLegal realismRight to propertyLegal professionSociologyEpistemologyPhilosophy

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

This article explores the possibility of elaborating a strong rights foundation for ‘weak’ legal pluralist arrangements, consisting of the recognition by the state of a degree of autonomy for the legal practices of minorities. It finds unhelpful and reductionist those arguments based merely on whether certain aspects of minority law are in violation of human rights or are more effective at protecting rights than state law. Instead, the article seeks to tackle the central issue of whether there is more generally a human rights case for legal pluralism, despite the modern rights movement's strong historical association with state monism and egalitarian universalism. Traditional rights bases for minority protection, both group and individual based, are envisaged specifically from the point of view of recognition of minority legal traditions. Both are found to raise difficulties that are magnified by the entry into play of legal considerations. When it comes to collective rights, there is a fear that endowing certain communities with legal autonomy will increase their ability to oppress the minority within; when it comes to individual rights, the idea of a ‘right to one's law’ misses the degree to which law is an institutional construct which requires a new division of power within the state that goes far beyond what are generally understood as basic freedoms. Rather than assessing the problem merely from an individual or group point of view, the rights validity of legal pluralist arrangements is seen as dependent on how they relate to society at large. Specifically, a case is made that legal pluralism can be part of a beneficial coming to terms by societies with their diversity, a reinforcement of democratic forms and, in some cases, a type of transitional justice that recognises the extent to which the deprivation of law has been a traditional means of subjugation of minorities. The article concludes with an effort to recast the entire debate from the point of view of international human rights law and to critique its somewhat arbitrary focus on the state as the only locus of significant legal diversity.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.015
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.010
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.015
Threshold uncertainty score0.080

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0150.010
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.001
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.001
Bibliometrics0.0020.001
Science and technology studies0.0080.092
Scholarly communication0.0150.023
Open science0.0020.010
Research integrity0.0080.010
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0050.001

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.132
GPT teacher head0.393
Teacher spread0.261 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations5
Published2012
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

Explore more

Same venueIsrael Law ReviewSame topicHuman Rights and DevelopmentFrench-language works237,207