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Record W2097731133 · doi:10.1002/sat.1038

Security in DVB‐RCS2

2013· article· en· W2097731133 on OpenAlex

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

affAt least one author lists a Canadian institution in the pinned OpenAlex snapshot.

Bibliographic record

VenueInternational Journal of Satellite Communications and Networking · 2013
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldComputer Science
TopicAdvanced Data Storage Technologies
Canadian institutionsAdvantech AMT (Canada)
Fundersnot available
KeywordsComputer scienceDigital Video BroadcastingTelecommunicationsReturn channelDigital televisionComputer securityBroadcasting (networking)Channel (broadcasting)

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

SUMMARY This paper presents security features in the second generation digital video broadcasting with return channel via satellite standard (DVB‐RCS2). The up‐front consideration of security, and in particular transmission security (TRANSEC), started with the development of security requirements introduced in the DVB‐RCS Next Generation (NG) Commercial Requirements and Call for Technologies. It was apparent at an early stage that no single approach or implementation would satisfy the wide range of product and security requirements to span consumer, professional and government market sectors. This led to the introduction and development of two important concepts: TRANSEC profiles, a specialization of DVB‐RCS2 system level profiles concept; and TRANSEC ‘hooks’, extension points that allow TRANSEC functionality to be added as necessary, governed by profile security requirements. The bulk of this paper outlines and describes the three TRANSEC profiles presented in the DVB‐RCS2 Lower Layer Guidelines document. Finally, the various profiles are compared and contrasted. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.000
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Other design · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.968
Threshold uncertainty score0.461

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.001
Open science0.0020.001
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.026
GPT teacher head0.291
Teacher spread0.265 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it