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Record W2103798146 · doi:10.1186/1478-4505-12-28

Advancing the application of systems thinking in health: why cure crowds out prevention

2014· article· en· W2103798146 on OpenAlex

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

fundA Canadian funder is recorded on the work.
no affNo Canadian affiliation: this work is invisible to an affiliation-only frame.
No Canadian affiliation. An affiliation-only frame, the usual design, would never have seen this work. It is one of the works that make the case for inverting the frame.

Bibliographic record

VenueHealth Research Policy and Systems · 2014
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldDecision Sciences
TopicComplex Systems and Decision Making
Canadian institutionsnot available
FundersEunice Kennedy Shriver National Institute of Child Health and Human DevelopmentAlliance for Health Policy and Systems ResearchInternational Development Research CentreBloomberg PhilanthropiesWorld Health Organization
KeywordsCrowdsPublic healthHealth services researchHealth administrationHealth informaticsHealth policyMedicineNursingEnvironmental healthComputer scienceComputer security

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

INTRODUCTION: This paper presents a system dynamics computer simulation model to illustrate unintended consequences of apparently rational allocations to curative and preventive services. METHODS: A modeled population is subject to only two diseases. Disease A is a curable disease that can be shortened by curative care. Disease B is an instantly fatal but preventable disease. Curative care workers are financed by public spending and private fees to cure disease A. Non-personal, preventive services are delivered by public health workers supported solely by public spending to prevent disease B. Each type of worker tries to tilt the balance of government spending towards their interests. Their influence on the government is proportional to their accumulated revenue. RESULTS: The model demonstrates effects on lost disability-adjusted life years and costs over the course of several epidemics of each disease. Policy interventions are tested including: i) an outside donor rationally donates extra money to each type of disease precisely in proportion to the size of epidemics of each disease; ii) lobbying is eliminated; iii) fees for personal health services are eliminated; iv) the government continually rebalances the funding for prevention by ring-fencing it to protect it from lobbying.The model exhibits a "spend more get less" equilibrium in which higher revenue by the curative sector is used to influence government allocations away from prevention towards cure. Spending more on curing disease A leads paradoxically to a higher overall disease burden of unprevented cases of disease B. This paradoxical behavior of the model can be stopped by eliminating lobbying, eliminating fees for curative services, and ring-fencing public health funding. CONCLUSIONS: We have created an artificial system as a laboratory to gain insights about the trade-offs between curative and preventive health allocations, and the effect of indicative policy interventions. The underlying dynamics of this artificial system resemble features of modern health systems where a self-perpetuating industry has grown up around disease-specific curative programs like HIV/AIDS or malaria. The model shows how the growth of curative care services can crowd both fiscal and policy space for the practice of population level prevention work, requiring dramatic interventions to overcome these trends.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.101
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.009
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesMetaresearch
Consensus categoriesMetaresearch
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.940
Threshold uncertainty score1.000

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.1010.009
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.000
Bibliometrics0.0010.002
Science and technology studies0.0010.000
Scholarly communication0.0010.000
Open science0.0010.000
Research integrity0.0000.001
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.503
GPT teacher head0.596
Teacher spread0.093 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it