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THE IMPACT OF ENTITLEMENTS AND EQUITY ON COOPERATIVE BARGAINING: AN EXPERIMENT

2011· article· en· W2111660538 on OpenAlex

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

affAt least one author lists a Canadian institution in the pinned OpenAlex snapshot.

Bibliographic record

VenueEconomic Inquiry · 2011
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldSocial Sciences
TopicExperimental Behavioral Economics Studies
Canadian institutionsUniversity of Calgary
Fundersnot available
KeywordsStatus quoEntitlement (fair division)NegotiationBargaining problemEconomicsEquity (law)Outcome (game theory)ArbitrationPareto principleMicroeconomicsPublic economicsPolitical scienceLawMarket economy

Abstract

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In some bargaining situations—for example, collaborative policy making and compulsory arbitration—a third party imposes a backstop position that differs from the status quo. Axiomatic models of cooperative bargaining presume that the status quo in such cases will have no effect on the negotiated outcome, especially if it is Pareto inferior to the backstop. Recent literatures on equity and entitlement, however, suggest that the status quo may establish a focal point that acts as an “anchor” in current negotiations, affecting any ultimate agreement. In a two‐party, two‐attribute experiment, in which subjects jointly select from up to 200 options, we find evidence (1) that the status quo matters, perhaps because of “entitlement effects” and (2) that parties prefer egalitarian outcomes to the Nash bargain. ( JEL C92, D74, H44, Q58)

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.000
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Qualitative · Consensus signal: Qualitative
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.252
Threshold uncertainty score0.629

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.001
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.223
GPT teacher head0.457
Teacher spread0.234 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it