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Record W2125044738 · doi:10.1093/jiel/jgu008

Comparing the 'Four Pillars' of Global Economic Governance: A Critical Analysis of the Institutional Design of the FSB, IMF, World Bank, and WTO

2014· article· en· W2125044738 on OpenAlex

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

affAt least one author lists a Canadian institution in the pinned OpenAlex snapshot.

Bibliographic record

VenueJournal of International Economic Law · 2014
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldSocial Sciences
TopicWorld Trade Organization Law
Canadian institutionsCentre for International Governance Innovation
Fundersnot available
KeywordsMandateCorporate governanceEnforcementTreatyPaymentBalance of paymentsBusinessEconomicsPublic administrationAccountingInternational tradeFinancePolitical scienceLawInternational economics

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Why are the intergovernmental organizations referred to as the ‘four pillars’ of international economic governance designed the way they are? Although much of their institutional design—issues like voting, membership, mandate, and funding—can be traced back to the history of the organization and the circumstances in which states established it, the institutional setup of each organization should ideally correspond with the type of public good it seeks to provide. Formal organizations like the World Trade Organization (WTO) are treaty-based, requiring strict conditions for membership and a high degree of legal rules and enforcement. They were also established to carry out a specific function, such as balance of payment issues for the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Bodies such as the Financial Stability Board (FSB), the new player in the field of economic governance, are less formal, and are concerned with monitoring, advising, and coordination of regulatory efforts. In some cases, the roles of these organizations have expanded into new areas, or they have had functions replaced by other international bodies, especially in the wake of events such as the 1997 and 2008 financial crises. This article seeks to understand how the design of these institutions is influenced not only by the states that established them, but also by the overarching goals the organization seeks to achieve, and its place within the broader framework of global economic governance. The article begins by comparing the institutional design of the IMF, the WTO, the World Bank, and the FSB. It compares the organizations’ legal basis, membership, organs, and decision-making processes, as well as the methods by which they develop and enforce rules for the global economy. The article examines how these very different institutional setups relate to the goals of each organization. How has the design and function of these organizations changed over time, and to what extent has this change been due to the changing role of the organization, especially in light of events such as the 1997 and 2008 financial crises? Particular emphasis is given to the level of formality with which these organizations operate—when does the organization require strict rules regarding funding, voting, and membership, and when are more informal processes more appropriate? Finally, the article seeks to understand to what extent these organizations, despite their differences in terms of mandate, structure, and methods are able to work together effectively and develop policies that are mutually consistent. An understanding of these dynamics will be useful in further discussions about how these organizations might be designed and structured better in order to address the challenges facing the global economy.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Observational · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.824
Threshold uncertainty score0.439

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.001
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0010.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.020
GPT teacher head0.276
Teacher spread0.256 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it