Managerial Incentives and Audit Fees: Evidence from the Mutual Fund Industry
Why is this work in the frame?
A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.
No Canadian affiliation. An affiliation-only frame — the usual design — would never have seen this work. It is one of the works that make the case for inverting the frame.
The three-model screen
all 1,000 screened works →All three models called this out of scope.
Financial audit fees and managerial incentives in mutual funds; 'audit' here is financial, not research evaluation.
The study examines audit fees and managerial incentives in mutual funds, not research practice.
Accounting study of mutual-fund audit fees and managerial incentives; financial audit, not research integrity.
Abstract
We examine the relation between audit fees and managerial incentives in the mutual fund industry. Using proxies for managerial incentives based on fund organizational form, advisor compensation, and fund expenses, we find that audit fees are higher when managerial incentives are poor. Our results represent new evidence on the relation between audit fees and managerial incentives.
Stored with the screening record, where it is evidence for the labels above.
The record
- Venue
- Accounting and Finance Research
- Topic
- Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance
- Field
- Business, Management and Accounting
- Canadian institutions
- —
- Funders
- —
- Keywords
- IncentiveAuditBusinessMutual fundCompensation (psychology)AccountingFinanceFund administrationFund of fundsEconomicsMicroeconomics
- Has abstract in OpenAlex
- yes