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Record W2131200747

Fail-Safe Federalism and Climate Change: The Case of U.S. and Canadian Forest Policy

2011· article· en· W2131200747 on OpenAlexaboutno aff
Blake Hudson

Bibliographic record

VenueOpenCommons - UConn (University of Connecticut) · 2011
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldSocial Sciences
TopicLegal Systems and Judicial Processes
Canadian institutionsnot available
Fundersnot available
KeywordsFederalismTreatyDecentralizationGovernment (linguistics)Climate changePolitical scienceCorporate governanceNegotiationPublic administrationBusinessPoliticsLawEcologyFinance
DOInot available

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Recent research demonstrates the difficulties that federal systems of government may present for international treaty formation, a prime example being legally binding treaties aimed at harnessing global forests to regulate climate change. Some federal constitutions, such as the U.S. and Canadian constitutions, grant subnational governments virtually exclusive direct forest management regulatory authority for non-federally owned forests. With subnational governments controlling sixty-five percent offorests in the United States and eighty-four percent in Canada, the U.S. and Canadian federal governments may be constrained during international negotiations and unable to legally bind subnational governments to any agreement prescribing methods of utilizing these forests to combat climate change. These constraints are especially important since these two countries control fifteen percent of the world's forests. Decentralized forest policy in the U..S. and Canada certainly provides valuable benefits. Yet constitutional decentralization in federal systems should be more effectively balanced with global forest governance if that mechanism for addressing climate change is to be preserved in its most flexible form. Though a binding agreement has yet to materialize, and other increasingly touted mechanisms may be utilized to tackle climate change, it is imperative that world governments maintain every legal and policy tool at their disposal to address the problem. A recent comparative constitutional analysis of five federal systems controlling fiftyfour percent of global forests determined that the United States and Canada lack two of the three key elements offederal constitutional structure that best facilitate a federal nation's ability to enter into and successfully implement an international climate agreement including forests while also preserving the recognized benefits of decentralized forest policy. This Article addresses how these constitutional deficiencies might be remedied to achieve more effective climate and forest governance. In other words, the Article explores mechanisms for establishing "Fail-safe Federalism " for forest management in the United States and Canada, by first highlighting the domestic nuances of both constitutional structure and forest policy in the two countries and next assessing whether top-down, bilateral, horizontal, or transnational approaches are the most effective mechanisms for forging Fail-safe Federalism within each.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.011
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.020
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Qualitative · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.807
Threshold uncertainty score0.936

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0110.020
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.001
Bibliometrics0.0030.006
Science and technology studies0.0520.022
Scholarly communication0.0120.003
Open science0.0030.005
Research integrity0.0070.009
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0060.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.051
GPT teacher head0.266
Teacher spread0.215 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designQualitative
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations0
Published2011
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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