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Record W2136776938 · doi:10.1109/tac.2012.2215399

Nash, Social and Centralized Solutions to Consensus Problems via Mean Field Control Theory

2012· article· en· W2136776938 on OpenAlexaff
Mojtaba Nourian, Peter E. Caines, Roland P. Malhamé, Minyi Huang

Bibliographic record

VenueIEEE Transactions on Automatic Control · 2012
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldPhysics and Astronomy
TopicOpinion Dynamics and Social Influence
Canadian institutionsCarleton UniversityPolytechnique MontréalMcGill UniversityGroup for Research in Decision Analysis
Fundersnot available
KeywordsNash equilibriumPopulationMathematical optimizationMean field theoryMathematicsMathematical economicsField (mathematics)Social choice theoryApplied mathematicsComputer sciencePure mathematics

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

The purpose of this paper is to synthesize initial mean consensus behavior of a set of agents from the fundamental optimization principles of i) stochastic dynamic games, and ii) optimal control. In the stochastic dynamic game model each agent seeks to minimize its individual quadratic discounted cost function involving the mean of the states of all other agents. In this formulation we derive the limiting infinite population mean field equation system and explicitly compute its unique solution. The resulting mean field (MF) control strategies drive each agent to track the overall population's initial state distribution mean, and by applying these decentralized strategies, any finite population system reaches mean consensus asymptotically as time goes to infinity. Furthermore, these control laws possess an εN-Nash equilibrium property where εNgoes to zero as the population size N goes to infinity. Finally, the analysis is extended to the case of random mean field couplings. In the social cooperative formulation the basic objective is to minimize a social cost as the sum of the individual cost functions containing mean field coupling. In this formulation we show that for any individual agent the decentralized mean field social (MF Social) control strategy is the same as the mean field Nash (MF Nash) equilibrium strategy. Hence MF-Nash ControlsUNashN=MF - Social ControlsUSocN. On the other hand, the solution to the centralized LQR optimal control formulation yields the Standard Consensus (SC) algorithm whenever the graph representing the corresponding topology of the network is Completely Connected (CC). Hence Cent. LQR ControlsUCentN=SC-CC ControlsUSCN. Moreover, a system with centralized control laws reaches consensus on the initial state distribution mean as time and population size N go to infinity. Hence, asymptotically in time MF-Nash ControlsUNashN=MF-Social ControlsUSocN= Cent. LQR ControlsUCent∞= SC-CC ControlsUSC∞. Finally, the analysis is extended to the long time average (LTA) cost functions case.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.003
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Other · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.004
Threshold uncertainty score0.012

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.003
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0010.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.001
Bibliometrics0.0010.000
Science and technology studies0.0010.002
Scholarly communication0.0010.002
Open science0.0010.001
Research integrity0.0010.001
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0020.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.014
GPT teacher head0.261
Teacher spread0.247 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreOther

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations97
Published2012
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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