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Record W2137656620 · doi:10.1145/1807342.1807385

The unavailable candidate model

2010· article· en· W2137656620 on OpenAlex

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

affAt least one author lists a Canadian institution in the pinned OpenAlex snapshot.

Bibliographic record

Venuenot available
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
TopicGame Theory and Voting Systems
Canadian institutionsUniversity of Toronto
Fundersnot available
KeywordsRanking (information retrieval)Social choice theoryComputer scienceVotingRank (graph theory)Set (abstract data type)Representation (politics)Outcome (game theory)Majority ruleSimple (philosophy)Aggregation problemGreedy algorithmTheoretical computer scienceArtificial intelligenceMachine learningMathematical economicsMathematicsAlgorithm

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

One of the fundamental problems in the theory of social choice is aggregating the rankings of a set of agents (or voters) into a consensus ranking. Rank aggregation has found application in a variety of computational contexts. However, the goal of constructing a consensus ranking rather than, say, a single outcome (or winner) is often left unjustified, calling into question the suitability of classical rank aggregation methods. We introduce a novel model which offers a decision-theoretic motivation for constructing a consensus ranking. Our unavailable candidate model assumes that a consensus choice must be made, but that candidates may become unavailable after voters express their preferences. Roughly speaking, a consensus ranking serves as a compact, easily communicable representation of a decision policy that can be used to make choices in the face of uncertain candidate availability. We use this model to define a principled aggregation method that minimizes expected voter dissatisfaction with the chosen candidate. We give exact and approximation algorithms for computing optimal rankings and provide computational evidence for the effectiveness of a simple greedy scheme. We also describe strong connections to popular voting protocols such as the plurality rule and the Kemeny consensus, showing specifically that Kemeny produces optimal rankings in the unavailable candidate model under certain conditions.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesInsufficient payload (model declined to judge)
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.531
Threshold uncertainty score0.998

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.003

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.020
GPT teacher head0.204
Teacher spread0.184 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Quick stats

Citations30
Published2010
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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