Regulator's Determination of Return on Equity in the Absence of Public Firms: The Case of Automobile Insurance in Ontario
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Abstract In a regulated market, such as automobile insurance (AI), regulators set the return on equity that insurers are allowed to achieve. Most insurers are engaged in a variety of insurance lines of business, and thus the full information beta methodology (FIB) is commonly employed to estimate the AI beta. The FIB uses two steps: first, the beta of each insurer is estimated, and then the beta of each line of business is estimated, as the beta of an insurer is a weighted average of the betas of the lines of business. When there are a sufficient number of public companies, company and market returns are used. Otherwise, researchers have resorted to using accounting data in the FIB. Theoretically, the two steps are not separable and the estimation should be done with one step. We introduce the one‐step methodology in our article. The one‐step and two‐step methodologies are compared empirically for the Ontario market of AI. Insurers in Ontario are predominantly private companies; thus, accounting data are used to estimate the AI beta. We show that a significant bias is introduced by the traditional, two‐step FIB methodology in estimating the betas for different lines of business, while insurers’ betas are very similar under both methods. This has a significant application to the estimation of betas of “pure players” in classic corporate finance. It implies that their betas and hence the resulting, required rates of return used in the net present value calculations should be estimated based on the one‐step method that we develop in this article.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.003 | 0.014 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.002 | 0.001 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.002 | 0.001 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Research integrity | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.002 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".