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Record W2139204976 · doi:10.1287/isre.2014.0522

<b>Research Note</b>—Influence Techniques in Phishing Attacks: An Examination of Vulnerability and Resistance

2014· article· en· W2139204976 on OpenAlex

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

fundA Canadian funder is recorded on the work.
no affNo Canadian affiliation: this work is invisible to an affiliation-only frame.
No Canadian affiliation. An affiliation-only frame, the usual design, would never have seen this work. It is one of the works that make the case for inverting the frame.

Bibliographic record

VenueInformation Systems Research · 2014
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldComputer Science
TopicSpam and Phishing Detection
Canadian institutionsnot available
FundersUniversity of British ColumbiaTemple University
KeywordsPhishingPersuasionVulnerability (computing)Computer securityEspionageInternet privacyIndustrial espionageComputer sciencePsychologySocial psychologyWorld Wide WebThe InternetPolitical scienceLaw

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Phishing is a major threat to individuals and organizations. Along with billions of dollars lost annually, phishing attacks have led to significant data breaches, loss of corporate secrets, and espionage. Despite the significant threat, potential phishing targets have little theoretical or practical guidance on which phishing tactics are most dangerous and require heightened caution. The current study extends persuasion and motivation theory to postulate why certain influence techniques are especially dangerous when used in phishing attacks. We evaluated our hypotheses using a large field experiment that involved sending phishing messages to more than 2,600 participants. Results indicated a disparity in levels of danger presented by different influence techniques used in phishing attacks. Specifically, participants were less vulnerable to phishing influence techniques that relied on fictitious prior shared experience and were more vulnerable to techniques offering a high level of self-determination. By extending persuasion and motivation theory to explain the relative efficacy of phishers' influence techniques, this work clarifies significant vulnerabilities and lays the foundation for individuals and organizations to combat phishing through awareness and training efforts.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.030
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.002
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesMetaresearch
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Other design · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.782
Threshold uncertainty score0.999

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0300.002
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0010.001
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0010.006
Open science0.0010.000
Research integrity0.0000.001
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.066
GPT teacher head0.391
Teacher spread0.325 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it