How does regulation affect the risk taking of banks? A U.S. and Canadian perspective
Bibliographic record
Abstract
This historical study utilizes annual insured bank data from 1936 through 1989 to empirically evaluate the impact of bank regulation on bank risk taking in a cross‐country comparison of the United States and Canada. Risk is hypothesized to be determined, in part, by the regulatory environment in which a bank operates. The findings of this analysis contributes to the contemporary deregulation policy debate, since both branch banking restrictions and deposit insurance variables are found to be detrimental to bank stability. More specifically, these results support the 1994 Riegle‐Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act, which removed legislative bamers to interstate branching. These results also confirm expectations that deposit insurance increases risk taking and supports the 1991 mandate by regulators that risk‐based deposit insurance be created. Further, these findings support the 1988 Basel Accord to standardize bank capital requirements internationally and to link these standards to bank risk taking.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.002 | 0.008 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.003 | 0.006 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.003 | 0.002 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.004 | 0.001 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Research integrity | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.003 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".