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Record W2145075030 · doi:10.1109/gamenets.2009.5137398

Nash equilibrium design and optimization

2009· article· en· W2145075030 on OpenAlex

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

affAt least one author lists a Canadian institution in the pinned OpenAlex snapshot.

Bibliographic record

Venuenot available
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldDecision Sciences
TopicGame Theory and Applications
Canadian institutionsUniversity of Toronto
Fundersnot available
KeywordsNash equilibriumMathematical optimizationComputer scienceEpsilon-equilibriumBest responseMaximizationContext (archaeology)Class (philosophy)Game theoryMathematical economicsCorrelated equilibriumEquilibrium selectionRepeated gameMathematicsArtificial intelligence

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

The general problem of Nash equilibrium design is investigated from an optimization perspective. Within this context, a specific but fairly broad class of noncooperative games are considered that have been applied to a variety of settings including network congestion control, wireless uplink power control, and optical power control. The Nash equilibrium design problem is analyzed under various knowledge assumptions (full versus limited information) and design objectives (QoS versus utility maximization). Among other results, the ldquoprice of anarchyrdquo is shown not to be an inherent feature of games that incorporate pricing mechanisms, but merely a misconception that often stems from arbitrary choice of game parameters. Moreover, a simple linear pricing is sufficient for design of Nash equilibrium according to a chosen global objective for a general class of games and under suitable information assumptions.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Methods · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.864
Threshold uncertainty score0.737

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0010.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.122
GPT teacher head0.380
Teacher spread0.257 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Quick stats

Citations64
Published2009
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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