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Record W2149826777 · doi:10.1145/1869790.1869797

VeriPlace

2010· article· en· W2149826777 on OpenAlex

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

affAt least one author lists a Canadian institution in the pinned OpenAlex snapshot.
fundA Canadian funder is recorded on the work.

Bibliographic record

Venuenot available
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldComputer Science
TopicPrivacy-Preserving Technologies in Data
Canadian institutionsUniversity of Waterloo
FundersNatural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada
KeywordsComputer scienceMathematical proofKey (lock)ArchitectureLocation-based serviceComputer securityCheatingComponent (thermodynamics)World Wide WebComputer network

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Recently, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of location-based services, with services like Foursquare or Yelp having hundreds of thousands of users. A user's location is a crucial factor for enabling these services. Many services rely on users to correctly report their location. However, if there is an incentive, users might lie about their location. A location proof architecture enables users to collect proofs for being at a location and services to validate these proofs. It is essential that this proof collection and validation does not violate user privacy. We introduce VeriPlace, a location proof architecture with user privacy as a key design component. In addition, VeriPlace can detect cheating users who collect proofs for places where they are not located. We also present an implementation and a performance evaluation of VeriPlace and its integration with Yelp.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.000
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.008
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesOpen science
Consensus categoriesOpen science
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Not applicable · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Methods · Consensus signal: Methods
Teacher disagreement score0.655
Threshold uncertainty score0.972

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0000.008
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0340.086
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.018
GPT teacher head0.262
Teacher spread0.244 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Quick stats

Citations90
Published2010
Admission routes2
Has abstractyes

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