Pricing strategies with reference effects in competitive industries
Why this work is in the frame
A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Abstract This paper examines the effect of reference prices on companies operating within competitive industries. We confirm that even with competition, firms optimally price high in the short term to generate a high reference price and then decrease this price over time. Competitors' prices converge toward each other over time, emphasizing the short‐term nature of reference prices. We then show that pricing optimally to take advantage of reference prices generates a positive externality for other firms in an industry, such that competitors may generate higher profit. The longer the focus of a given firm, the more profit the firm generates, but less relative to its competitors. This arises because the externalities created through pricing high to increase reference prices outweigh the benefits of the higher reference prices themselves. If pricing managers are compensated relative to their competition, this suggests that short‐termism may be implicitly encouraged to the detriment of profit.
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Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.003 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it