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Record W2166100521 · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1050.0391

Research Note—Price Discrimination After the Purchase: Rebates as State-Dependent Discounts

2005· article· en· W2166100521 on OpenAlex

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

affAt least one author lists a Canadian institution in the pinned OpenAlex snapshot.

Bibliographic record

VenueManagement Science · 2005
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldBusiness, Management and Accounting
TopicConsumer Market Behavior and Pricing
Canadian institutionsUniversity of Toronto
Fundersnot available
KeywordsPrice discriminationArbitrageEconomicsMicroeconomicsProperty (philosophy)BusinessWillingness to payAdvertisingFocus (optics)Contrast (vision)State (computer science)MarketingMonetary economicsFinancial economicsComputer science

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Promotional tools such as rebates and coupons are usually seen as different ways of price discriminating among consumers. We focus on a different property of rebates: their ability to price discriminate within a consumer among her postpurchase states. Unlike price discrimination between consumers, this property is unique to rebates because, by design, they are redeemed after the purchase. (Coupons, by contrast, are redeemed with the purchase.) The consumer redeems the rebate only in postpurchase states in which her marginal utility of income is high. This selective redemption behavior provides an opportunity for the seller to “utility arbitrage,” directing discounts to when they matter most, resulting in an increase in the consumer’s up-front willingness to pay. In turn, this enables an increase in the regular price. Of course, rebates can still price discriminate among consumers. Indeed, their ability to deliver state-dependent discounts may enhance their overall price discrimination ability, as we show in an example comparing them to coupons.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.005
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesScholarly communication, Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Other design · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.945
Threshold uncertainty score0.999

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0050.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0010.002
Science and technology studies0.0010.001
Scholarly communication0.0020.003
Open science0.0010.001
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0010.002

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.030
GPT teacher head0.325
Teacher spread0.295 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it