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That Which Makes the Sensation of Blue a Mental Fact: Moore on Phenomenal Relationism

2007· article· en· W2170324378 on OpenAlex

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

affAt least one author lists a Canadian institution in the pinned OpenAlex snapshot.

Bibliographic record

VenueEuropean Journal of Philosophy · 2007
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldPsychology
TopicPhilosophy and Theoretical Science
Canadian institutionsUniversity of Toronto
Fundersnot available
KeywordsPerceptionConsciousnessReading (process)Interpretation (philosophy)Argument (complex analysis)Context (archaeology)EpistemologyPsychologyPhilosophyRelation (database)AestheticsLinguisticsHistoryComputer science

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

A gift of a dollar for each article in the philosophy of perception and consciousness published since 1990 making reference, explicitly or implicitly, to Moore's discussion in the second half of Moore 1903 1 of an alleged ‘transparency’ and ‘diaphanousness’ pertaining to some aspect of perceptual experience would very likely cover the tab of a mid‐priced dinner for two. 2 Moore's poetically expressed observations have captured the imagination of contemporary philosophers of perception and consciousness, and have served as the basis of much fruitful discussion in those areas. Still, despite all the attention these observations have received, the contemporary literature lacks a close reading of the second half of Moore's paper, without which it is impossible to understand Moore's observations in the context in which they were originally expressed. It is understandable that such a close reading is lacking: the second half of Moore's paper has been rightly described by one of his most sympathetic and dedicated interpreters as ‘extremely dense and opaque’ ( Klemke 2000 : 55). 3 But despite the evident difficulties of the task, I aim here, with some trepidation, to provide the missing close reading. The main points of my interpretation will be these. The centerpiece of the anti‐idealist manoeuvrings of the second half of the paper is a phenomenological argument for what I will call a relational view of perceptual phenomenal character, on which, roughly, ‘that which makes the sensation of blue a mental fact’ is a relation of conscious awareness, a view close to the opposite of the most characteristic contemporary view going under the transparency rubric. 4 The discussion of transparency and diaphanousness is a sidelight, its principal purpose to shore up the main line of argumentation against criticism; in those passages all Moore argues is that the relation of conscious awareness is not transparent, while acknowledging that it can seem to be. My discussion will proceed as follows. In section 1 , I will discuss some theses and elucidate some notions from the philosophy of perception and consciousness which will be central to my interpretation; having done so, I will be in a position to explain how an accurate understanding of Moore may contribute to theoretical advances in the philosophy of perception and consciousness. The next two sections contain the exegetical heart of the paper: section 2 provides an analysis of Moore's case for the relational view; section 3 attempts to explain the place of the relational view in the overall refutation of idealism. Section 4 critically discusses a pair of competing interpretations. Section 5 wraps things up, drawing concluding morals as to the campaigns on behalf of which Moore should and should not be enlisted.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.003
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.575
Threshold uncertainty score0.348

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0030.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.044
GPT teacher head0.289
Teacher spread0.244 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it