Colonialism, Bolsheviks, and Ukraine

435 Ab Imperio, 2/2009 В целом книга Лихачева содер- жит много фактического материа- ла и может быть использована как справочник. Однако ее ценность как источника данных подрыва- ется отсутствием категориального аппарата и ссылок, прописи мето- дов исследования (непонятно, от- куда автор черпает те же бытовые сведения: например, кажущееся читателю комичным и просто странным упоминание о том, что один из персонажей, Анатолий Тишин, “в последние годы не пьет”, С. 107). Работа Лихачева лишний раз демонстрирует: время описания националистических движений прошло безвозвратно. Пора пере- ходить к серьезному фундамен- тальному теоретическому анализу причин их появления, идеологии и деятельности. Stephen VELYCHENKO Colonialism, Bolsheviks, and Ukraine Микола Дорошко. Номенкла- тура: Керівна верхівка радянської України (1917–1938 рр.). Киів: “Ніка-Центр”, 2008. 365 с. ISBN: 978-966-521-484-7; Геннадій Ефіменко. Взаємовід- носини Кремля та радянської України: Економічний аспект (1917–1919 pp.). Киів: НАНУ, 2008. 229 с. ISBN: 978-966-024-918-9. They [Ukrainians] beat us [Bolsheviks] for a long time, and obviously at last we have understood that basic truth, that, first of all, Soviet power cannot be created in Ukraine without Russian communists and the workers of Petrograd and Moscow. Dmytro Manuilsky (1919) As far as the mass of the RCPin Ukraine [in 1919] is concerned , right-up to its leadership they have no sense whatsoever of Ukraine, of the particularities of the Ukrainian revolution, or in general, that Ukraine is a separate country and not “southern Russia” or “Little Russia.” Georgii Lapchynskii (1926) The books under review do not deal directly either with imperialism or colonialism. Indeed, one author 436 Рецензии/Reviews 1 In the context of English-language scholarship, his book complements the basic books on the subject that mention but do not elaborate upon economic issues before 1921:A. Adams. Bolsheviks in the Ukraine: Second Campaign, 1918–1919. New Haven, 1963; J. Borys. The Sovietization of Ukraine, 1917–1923: The Communist Doctrine and Practice of National Self-determination. Edmonton, 1980; and J. Mace. Communism and the Dilemmas of National Liberation: National Communism in Soviet Ukraine, 1918–1933. Cambridge, MA, 1983. 2 Bolsheviks representing 95 of Ukraine’s 300 soviets took power in Kharkiv on December 12 (25) with approximately 4,500 troops and Red Guards – of whom approximately 2,100 had arrived from Moscow the previous week. The Bolsheviks held 19 of the 40 seats in the city’s Soviet Executive in early December when they got it to drop its earlier support for Kyiv and align with Moscow. As of October 1917, Ukraine had 15,000 Red Guards. Moscow and Petrograd sent 31,000 Russian Red Guards into Ukraine on December 13 and 14 – before the Bolsheviks declared war on the Rada. Arms and munitions were shipped to the major Ukrainian cities on December 11. Istoriia mista Kharkova / Red. O. Iarmysh. Kharkiv, 2004. P. 161; R. Wade. Red Guards and Workers’ Militias in the Russian Revolution. Stanford, 1984. P. 270; V. Hrynevych et al. Istoriia Ukrains’kogo viis’ka 1917–1995. Kyiv, 1996. P. 49; M. Frenkin. Zakhvat vlasti Bol’shevikami v Rossii i rol’ tylovykh garnizonov armii: Podgotovka i provedenie oktiabr’skogo miatezha, 1917–1918 gg. Jerusalem, 1982. P. 339. specifically refuses to use these concepts while the other uncritically accepts them as given. Both, however, provide much new archival information about the early Soviet period and the workings of the political system that raise questions about how to characterize the relations of dominance and dependency they describe and with what best to compare them. Gennady Efimenko explains that the Russian Bolshevik need for Ukrainian resources determined their policy toward Ukraine. He reminds us that national issues cannot be confined to the linguistic/ethnic but must include the economic, and that the massive resistance that forced Lenin to grant Ukraine cultural and linguistic concessions in late 1919 failed to shake the control that by then Moscow had established over its economy and resources.1 Efimenko writes that what frightened Bolshevik leaders and prompted them to act was that their Ukrainian party comrades would follow the example of the Finnish Social Democrats and then, instead of paying for Ukrainian resources with worthless money or taking them by force, they would have to pay in gold or trade commodities for them. This terrible prospect appeared imminent in the first week of December 1917, when the Rada declared it would create a national bank and currency. Then, on December 6, not only did Finland declare independence, but the First Ukrainian Congress of Soviets recognized the Rada as Ukraine’s single legitimate government. Petrograd immediately declared this decision “illegal” and quickly set up a puppet regime in Kharkiv.2 Petrograd 437 Ab Imperio, 2/2009 then ensured that its new satellite remained in the ruble zone by denying it the right to print its own money. In July 1918, the Russian party branch in Ukraine, residing then in Moscow, formally gave Ukraine’s economy to Russia and...

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