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Record W2277393385 · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2015.2236

Optimal Price/Lead-Time Menus for Queues with Customer Choice: Segmentation, Pooling, and Strategic Delay

2016· article· en· W2277393385 on OpenAlex

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

affAt least one author lists a Canadian institution in the pinned OpenAlex snapshot.

Bibliographic record

VenueManagement Science · 2016
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldBusiness, Management and Accounting
TopicAdvanced Queuing Theory Analysis
Canadian institutionsWilfrid Laurier UniversityUniversity of Toronto
Fundersnot available
KeywordsPoolingMarket segmentationComputer scienceQueueLead timeValuation (finance)Queueing theoryRevenuePrice discriminationOperations researchBusinessMicroeconomicsMarketingEconomicsComputer network

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

How should a firm design a price/lead-time menu and scheduling policy to maximize revenues from heterogeneous time-sensitive customers with private information about their preferences? We consider a queueing system with multiple customer types that differ in their valuations for instant delivery and their delay costs. The distinctive feature of our model is that the ranking of customer preferences depends on lead times: patient customers are willing to pay more than impatient customers for long lead times, and vice versa for speedier service. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions, in terms of the capacity, the market size, and the properties of the valuation-delay cost distribution, for three features of the optimal menu and segmentation: pricing out the middle of the delay cost spectrum while serving both ends, pooling types with different delay costs into a single class, and strategic delay to deliberately inflate lead times. This paper was accepted by Assaf Zeevi, stochastic models and simulation.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.674
Threshold uncertainty score0.552

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.001
Science and technology studies0.0010.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.002
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.013
GPT teacher head0.253
Teacher spread0.241 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it