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Record W2288510092

Revenue monotonicity in combinatorial auctions

2007· article· en· W2288510092 on OpenAlexaff
Baharak Rastegari, Anne Condon, Kevin Leyton‐Brown

Bibliographic record

Venuenot available
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldDecision Sciences
TopicAuction Theory and Applications
Canadian institutionsUniversity of British Columbia
Fundersnot available
KeywordsCombinatorial auctionCommon value auctionRevenueMonotonic functionVickrey–Clarke–Groves auctionComputer scienceMechanism designCompetition (biology)Mathematical optimizationAuction theoryMathematical economicsMicroeconomicsEconomicsMathematicsFinance
DOInot available

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

In recent work [Rastegari et al. 2007a; 2007b] we study revenue properties of combinatorial auctions. Consider a well-known drawback of the famous VCG mechanism: a seller’s revenue can go down when bidders are added to an auction, contrary to the intuition that having more bidders should increase competition. Following an example due to Ausubel and Milgrom [2006], consider an auction with three bidders and two goods for sale. Suppose that bidder 2 wants both goods for the price of $2 billion whereas bidder 1 and bidder 3 are willing to pay $2 billion for the first and the second good respectively (see Figure 1). The VCG mechanism awards the goods to bidders 1 and 3 for the price of zero, yielding the seller zero revenue. However, in the absence of either bidder 1 or bidder 3, the revenue of the auction would be $2 billion. We say that an auction mechanism is revenue monotonic if the seller’s revenue is …

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.010
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.040
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.010
Threshold uncertainty score0.053

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0100.040
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0020.001
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0030.003
Bibliometrics0.0030.003
Science and technology studies0.0020.005
Scholarly communication0.0050.014
Open science0.0030.002
Research integrity0.0020.006
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0100.002

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.079
GPT teacher head0.423
Teacher spread0.344 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations27
Published2007
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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Same topicAuction Theory and ApplicationsFrench-language works237,207