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Record W2289706180 · doi:10.1109/icitst.2015.7412065

Fingerprint security for protecting EMV payment cards

2015· article· en· W2289706180 on OpenAlexaff
Himanshu Vats, Ron Ruhl, Shaun Aghili

Bibliographic record

Venuenot available
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldComputer Science
TopicBiometric Identification and Security
Canadian institutionsConcordia University of Edmonton
Fundersnot available
KeywordsComputer securityPaymentIdentity theftComputer scienceFingerprint (computing)BiometricsAuthentication (law)EavesdroppingCounterfeitInternet privacyCredit cardPayment cardIssuing bankCountermeasurePhishingThe InternetWorld Wide WebEngineering

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

EMV chip based payments cards have been used to combat fraudulent transactions such as counterfeit, lost and stolen cards. Despite of improved security measures payment cards are still not immune to some known threats and vulnerabilities such as card cloning, eavesdropping at POS and shoulder sniffing. A comprehensive study of the all possible threats and present security measures in payments cards is presented. This paper describes how fingerprint can be used for securing payment cards and further enhance the security of EMV environment. Comparison with presently practiced and implemented CHIP and PIN methods is shown elaborating the enhancing security and transaction time reduction by biometric cardholder authentication. Different methods of implementing fingerprint security in payment cards are provided. Major attacks on fingerprinting authentication are discussed and mitigation strategy is presented.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.001
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Not applicable · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Methods · Consensus signal: Methods
Teacher disagreement score0.002
Threshold uncertainty score0.008

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.001
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0010.001
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0010.002
Open science0.0010.001
Research integrity0.0010.001
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0020.001

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.064
GPT teacher head0.300
Teacher spread0.236 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designNot applicable
Domainnot available
GenreMethods

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations5
Published2015
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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