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Record W2313750538 · doi:10.1111/corg.12057

The Changing Latitude: Labor‐Sponsored Venture Capital Corporations in <scp>C</scp>anada

2014· article· en· W2313750538 on OpenAlex

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

affAt least one author lists a Canadian institution in the pinned OpenAlex snapshot.
aboutThe title or abstract carries a Canadian signal from the geographic lexicon.

Bibliographic record

VenueCorporate Governance An International Review · 2014
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldBusiness, Management and Accounting
TopicPrivate Equity and Venture Capital
Canadian institutionsYork University
Fundersnot available
KeywordsInvestment (military)Corporate governanceMandateBusinessVenture capitalPortfolioFinanceOpen-ended investment companyAccountingEconomicsReturn on investmentPolitical scienceProfit (economics)

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Abstract Manuscript Type Empirical Research Question/Issue This paper seeks to understand the role corporate governance and government policy plays in the portfolio choices of the labor‐sponsored venture capital corporations ( LSVCC s) in C anada. We investigate whether or not the change in tax policy announced in O ntario (2005) had an impact on the investment behavior of Ontario LSVCC s and whether the unique corporate governance structure of LSVCC s enables them to focus on their investment mandate subsequent to this announcement. Research Findings/Insights Our findings suggest that LSVCC s in O ntario are more likely to include public companies in their fund portfolios after the announcement of the change in tax policy. We find that after 2005, LSVCC s have increased their number of investments in public companies by 59.13 percent and in turn decreased their number of investments in private companies by 13.17 percent. On the other hand, we find no significant changes in investment behavior for LSVCC s in other provinces. In terms of the percentage of total investment in public companies, we find that the LSVCC s in Ontario are more likely to increase their total investment in public companies by 50 percent and to decrease their investment in the short term by 46.43 percent. LSVCC s in other provinces, however, are reducing their percentage of investment in public companies by 58.33 percent and increasing their total investment in private entrepreneurial firms by 38.33 percent in the same period. Theoretical/Academic Implications With a hand‐collected proprietary dataset, we are able to augment existing studies on the unique structure of LSVCC s in C anada with empirical evidence on the style drift due to the changes in government tax policy. We compare and contrast the investment behavior of LSVCC s before and after the tax policy change in O ntario as well as the investment behavior of LSVCC s in other provinces. We hypothesize that as a result of the elimination of the tax credits, the removal of certain investment restrictions, and weaker corporate governance, LSVCC s have drifted from their original mandate to invest in high‐risk venture companies to investing in less risky public companies. Such style drift may be a result of LSVCC s preparing for potential wealth transfer or liquidation by retail investors. More importantly, we find the unique corporate governance structure of LSVCC s may facilitate this drift from their original purpose of providing venture capital to small and medium‐sized entrepreneurial ( SME ) firms. Practitioner/Policy Implications We highlight that the style drift of LSVCC s in O ntario may result in such funds behaving more like other types of mutual funds and the deviation from their original mandate to provide venture capital may not only prove detrimental to entrepreneurial investee firms seeking such capital, but also negate any diversification benefits sought by fund investors. Also, such deviation may not necessarily justify the higher management expense ratio charged by LSVCC s.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.002
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.921
Threshold uncertainty score0.752

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.002
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.001
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.002
Open science0.0010.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.022
GPT teacher head0.245
Teacher spread0.223 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it