Bibliographic record
Abstract
Abstract This study examines different contract forms for the supply chain with quality improvement decision and retailer price decision. We consider three types of quality improvement: cost consuming, cost identical, and cost saving, which correspond to the cases in which quality improvement leads to an increment, no change, and a decrease in production cost, respectively. We compare the performance of two types of quality contracts: (1)pay‐before‐performancecontract, under which the supplier receives monetary support from the buyer before exerting quality improvement effort; and (2)pay‐after‐performancecontract, under which the supplier receives monetary compensation based on the outcome of effort. We find that the performance of each contract depends on the types of quality improvement. Further, the pay‐after‐performance contract leads to close‐to‐perfect contract efficiency and dominates the pay‐before‐performance contract from the supplier's perspective in most cases. However, this result does not apply in two extended cases: when there are multiple competing suppliers, the pay‐before‐performance contract can dominate the pay‐after‐performance contract if quality improvement is cost consuming; and when the buyer can exert sales effort, neither contract can achieve close‐to‐perfect efficiency in most cases.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.018 | 0.062 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.002 | 0.004 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.005 | 0.008 |
| Open science | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| Research integrity | 0.004 | 0.003 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.017 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".