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Record W2394809607

Economics of Security Patch Management.

2006· article· en· W2394809607 on OpenAlex

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

affAt least one author lists a Canadian institution in the pinned OpenAlex snapshot.

Bibliographic record

VenueWEIS · 2006
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldComputer Science
TopicInformation and Cyber Security
Canadian institutionsUniversity of British Columbia
Fundersnot available
KeywordsContext (archaeology)VendorStackelberg competitionComputer scienceComputer securityBusinessEconomicsMicroeconomicsMarketing
DOInot available

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Patch management is a crucial component of IT security programs. An important problem within this context is to determine how often to update the systems with necessary patches. Keeping the systems patched with more frequent patch updates increases operational costs while reducing security risks. On the other hand, leaving the systems unpatched with less frequent patch updates decreases operational costs while increasing security risks. In this paper we develop a game theoretic model to derive the optimal frequency of patch updates to balance the operational costs and damage costs associated with security vulnerabilities. We first analyze a centralized system in a benchmark case to find the socially optimal patch management policy and associated patch release cycle of the vendor and patch update cycle of the firm. Then we consider a noncentralized system in which the vendor determines its patch release policy and the firm selects its patch update policy in a Stackelberg framework. Given the results in centralized and noncentralized patch management, we next address how we can coordinate the patch release policy of the vendor and the patch update policy of the firm using cost sharing and/or liability to achieve the socially optimal patch management in a noncentralized setting.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.000
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.694
Threshold uncertainty score0.179

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.004
GPT teacher head0.181
Teacher spread0.177 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it